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For several decades, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has prevented
certain state and local governments from implementing any voting change,
such as a redistricting plan, until the federal government determines that the
change does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group.1  But this hallmark 2 civil rights remedy has its
troubles. It expires in 2007.3 And while there is a good chance Congress
will once again extend the life of Section 5,4 as it has on three prior
occasions,5 it is less likely the Supreme Court will once again uphold the
statute as constitutional.6
Doubt exists about the constitutionality of an extension of Section 5
because it is a law passed under the auspices of Congress's Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.7 At one time, that enforcement
power gave Congress broad latitude to do just about whatever it wished
when it came to passing civil rights legislation.8 The Court, however, has
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (describing a redistricting plan
as a voting change subject to Section 5).
2. See Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 340 (1996) (calling Section 5 the "single
most important provision of the Voting Rights Act and the key to preventing electoral
discrimination").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8).
4. See 150 CONG. REC. S1649-55 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (recording debate of amendment
sponsored by Senator Bill Frist, R-Tenn., that would permanently extend Section 5).
5. Section 5 was extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314-15 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 402-04 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 132-34 (1982).
6. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 on four occasions. Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980);
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that "[tihe Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (stating that "[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation"). At numerous places
throughout the Voting Rights Act, Congress explicitly states that the Act is enforcing the
"guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c); see also
Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the
Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1984) (describing the Act as "enacted under the
legislative authority conferred by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, [and] section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment").
8. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see also Geoffrey Landward, Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett and the Equal Education Opportunity Act:
Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 313, 318 (noting that Congress had "seemingly
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changed the ballgame in the past few years by seriously scaling back
Congress's ability to exercise that power.9 While there are a number of
intricacies to the Court's jurisprudence in this area, the desire to scale back
Congress's power is partly guided by separation of powers concerns in that
the Court seeks to decisively secure its role as the final arbiter in defining
the parameters of constitutional law. In other words, the Court endeavors to
prevent Congress from passing any statute that amounts to a wholesale
change of a constitutional standard previously handed down by the Court. °
Prior to the Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft,"1 this doctrinal shift
presented a problem for Section 5.12 The Constitution only protects against
purposeful racial discrimination in voting. 13 Section 5, however, primarily
served to protect minority voters from voting changes that had a
limitless" enforcement power in 1990).
9. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 445 (2000)
(describing how recent Court decisions "impose[d] new and substantial restrictions on Congress's
power to enact antidiscrimination laws under [its enforcement power]"); David S. Day, New
Dimensions of the Section 5 Enforcement Power, 47 S.D. L. REV. 366, 384 (2002) (describing how
recent Court decisions have "recast" the standard for judging Congress's exercise of its enforcement
power from "the deferential rational basis test to the non-deferential, searching scrutiny standard").
But see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (describing how Congress does not have "the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation"); see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977 ("City of
Boerne also confirmed, however, that it falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees."); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("City of Boerne also confirmed, however, the
long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance
of constitutional guarantees."); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("The ultimate interpretation and determination
of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.");
David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional
Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 34 (1997) (describing how, under Boerne,
"the Constitution has a determinate meaning that only the Supreme Court can divine, and if
Congress deviates from the Court's substantive understanding in any way, its actions are per se
invalid") (emphasis added); Post & Siegel, supra note 9, at 454 (asserting that "what really seems to
be at stake" for the Court is "the preservation of judicial control over the ultimate meaning of the
Constitution").
11. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
12. Other commentators have noted the difficulty presented to Section 5 by the Court's recent
decisions concerning the scope of Congress's enforcement power. See Victor Andres Rodriguez,
Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of
Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 769, 774 (2003) (asserting that "there is reason to be concerned that
the constitutional basis for broad remedial measures like Section 5, which is authorized under
Congress' Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, is newly vulnerable to attack"); see generally
Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still A
Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003) (discussing the
Court's treatment of Section 5).
13. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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discriminatory effect.'4 Thus, Section 5 arguably represented a change of
the constitutional standard that contravened the Court's view of what
separation of powers meant in the context of Congress's use of its
enforcement power.
Enter Georgia. At first impression, the decision merely provides
another unremarkable example of the Court's recent desire to curb federal
authority over state and local governments 5 as the decision primarily seems
designed at making it easier for those entities to garner Section 5 approval
for their voting changes. 16 For this reason, Georgia may well provide less
protection for minority voters because it reduces the ability of the federal
government to prevent discrimination in the electoral process. 17  After all,
this "unique and stijngent"'18 statute came into existence because state and
local governments often actively engaged in flagrant acts of voting-related
racial bias.' 9
14. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992); see also Vikram David Amar, The New "New Federalism, " 6 GREEN BAG 2D. 349, 349
(2003) (describing how "[flor the past decade and a half, the Rehnquist Court has been making its
historical mark by restriking the balance between federal and state powers").
16. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 485 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (three-judge panel) (explaining
that Georgia "gave states greater latitude in complying with the Voting Rights Act"); The Supreme
Court, 2002 Term, 117 HARV. L. REV. 469, 478 (2003) (noting that Georgia makes it "far easier for
states to obtain section 5 preclearance"); see also Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation:
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and
Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2381 (2003) (remarking that Georgia "cedes to covered
jurisdictions discretion unprecedented within the preclearance process to shape their electoral
districts"); Jeffrey McMurray, Georgia Case Redefines Rules on Black Districts, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, June 27, 2003, at 14 (describing how Georgia provides states with "more leeway" in
redistricting).
The Georgia opinion does not explicitly admit to making it easier for state and local
governments to get federal approval of voting changes. Rather, this purpose is implied from the
language of the opinion where, for the first time, the Court emphasizes how Section 5 gives states a
certain amount of "flexibility" in meeting the standard for federal approval. Georgia v. Ashcroft,
539 U.S. 461, 480-81 (2003) (allowing that Section 5 "does not dictate" that a State choose one
method of redistricting but rather "gives States the flexibility" to choose how to provide effective
representation to minority voters); id. at 483 (describing how Section 5 "leaves room for States to
use" different types of districts to allow for minority representation); id. at 489 (noting how "Section
5 gives States the flexibility to implement the type of plan that Georgia has submitted for
preclearance").
17. Id. at 494 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion "substantially
diminished" the requirement that jurisdictions adopt non-retrogressive voting changes).
18. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1249, 1250 (1989).
19. The history surrounding the passage of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has often and
thoroughly been explained. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1983).
While it is not my intention to ignore this history or diminish its importance, anothei lengthy
explication would add little to Section 5 scholarship.
In a nutshell, the Act was passed against the backdrop of extreme resistance, mostly in
Southern States, to African-American voter registration. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 192 F.
Supp. 677, 679-81 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (describing the discriminatory application of literacy tests in
Macon County). The Attorney General tried to put an end to these discriminatory tactics; however,
the time-consuming nature of litigation made for slow progress in achieving fair access to
registration for African-Americans. Hearings on S. 1564 Before Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
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But while Georgia could have a negative result for minority voters
because less protection against voting discrimination may be provided,
Georgia does contribute something positive to Section 5's future. For the
Court has, through Georgia, created a substantive standard that helps
conform the statute to the Court's recent pronouncements on the scope of
Congress's enforcement power as it relates to separation of powers concerns.
This is because Georgia moves Section 5 away from focusing purely on
discriminatory effects, making it possible to persuasively contend that
Section 5 no longer represents a wholesale change of the constitutional
standard by Congress, but instead involves a standard that more closely
approaches the constitutional norm for voting discrimination that has
previously been handed down by the Court.20
Before moving on, however, a couple of prefatory explanations on the
purpose and scope of this Article. First, this Article should not be read as
either an endorsement or criticism of the Georgia opinion. The opinion is
what it is. Plenty of academic commentary will most certainly ensue
claiming Georgia is rightly or wrongly decided. 21 Rather than criticizing or
championing the opinion, this Article seeks to harmonize Georgia with the
Court's more general framework for judging the propriety of congressional
civil rights remedies-to find what critics of the opinion might term a silver
lining in the Georgia cloud.
Second, even though Georgia creates a substantive Section 5 standard
that does not violate separation of powers principles, that was not (and is
89th Cong. 9-14 (1966) (statement of Attorney General Nicholas B. Katzenbach) (discussing length
of time necessary to obtain judicial relief in voting cases). Moreover, even when the Attorney
General won relief and secured a court injunction against a particular discriminatory voter
registration practice, state and local governments would adopt a new discriminatory device not
covered by the injunction. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing how new
discriminatory tools would be implemented within a day of the elimination of previous
discriminatory tools). Section 5 was enacted to freeze voting laws into place so that once a
discriminatory device was successfully challenged, a new discriminatory device could not be
implemented. As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted in 1982:
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution schemes were
employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote. Elective posts were made
appointive; election boundaries were gerrymandered; majority runoffs were instituted to
prevent victories under a plurality system; at-large elections were substituted for election
by single-member districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to prevent an
effective minority vote. The ingenuity of such schemes seems endless. Their common
purpose and effect has been to offset the gains made under the ballot box under the Act.
Congress anticipated this response. The preclearance provisions of Section 5 were
designed to halt such efforts.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183.
20. I first took up this idea in a footnote in a previous Article. See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 281 n.273 (2003).
21. Compare Richard H. Pildes, Less Power, More Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A15
(praising Georgia), with Lani Guinier, Saving Affirmative Action, VILLAGE VOICE, July 2, 2003, at
46 (criticizing Georgia).
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not) the entire breadth of the problem that the Court's enforcement power
doctrine presents for the future of Section 5. The Court's doctrine in this
area is also motivated by federalism concerns;22 and while Georgia does in
some manner reduce the federal government's power over state and local
governments, 3 it does so in a relatively small way. To put it more
concretely, Georgia makes no reduction in the number of state and local
governments subject to Section 5, does not reduce the types of voting
changes that must receive federal approval, and does nothing to make it
easier for state and local governments covered by Section 5 to escape the
grip of the statute's coverage.24 Changes that, in my opinion, Congress may
need to make to conform Section 5 to the Court's federalism values.2 5
I. THE SECTION 5 STANDARD PRIOR TO GEORGIA: RETROGRESSION AND
(JUST ABOUT) NOTHING BUT RETROGRESSION
Section 5 prevents certain state and local governments 26  from
implementing any change affecting voting,27 no matter how minor,28 until
22. See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1787 (2004) (describing how "City of Boerne primarily seems to express
separation of powers values... [b]ut City of Boerne also involved federalism values"); Cole, supra
note 10, at 37 (describing the twin motivations of Boerne); see also Day, supra note 9, at 371 (noting
that "there are two aspects to the Flores decision: the federalism aspect and a separation of powers
aspect") (internal quotations omitted).
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
25. See generally Pitts, supra note 20 (detailing the federalism problems created by an extension
of Section 5).
26. Section 5 applies to all or parts of sixteen states. Covered in their entirety are the states of
Alaska. Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas. and Virginia;
partially covered are the states of California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, and South Dakota. 28 C.F.R. § 51.67 tbl. (2003) (Jurisdictions Covered Under Section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, As Amended).
27. Changes affecting voting include, but are not limited to, the following examples:
(a) Any change in qualifications or eligibility for voting.
(b) Any change concerning registration, balloting, and the counting of votes and any
change concerning publicity for or assistance in registration or voting.
(c) Any change with respect to the use of a language other than English in any aspect of
the electoral process.
(d) Any change in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of polling places.
(e) Any change in the constituency of an official or the boundaries of a voting unit (e.g.,
through redistricting, annexation, deannexation, incorporation, reapportionment,
changing to at-large elections from district elections, or changing to district elections
from at-large elections).
(f) Any change in the method of determining the outcome of an election (e.g., by
requiring a majority vote for election or the use of a designated post or place system).
(g) Any change affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates, to
obtain a position on the ballot in primary or general elections, or to become or remain
holders of elective offices.
(h) Any change in the eligibility and qualification procedures for independent candidates.
(i) Any change in the term of an elective office or an elected official or in the offices that
are elective (e.g., by shortening the term of an office, changing from election to
appointment or staggering the terms of offices).
(j) Any change affecting the necessity of or methods for offering issues and propositions
for approval by referendum.
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federal approval has been obtained. 29 Federal approval, commonly known
as "preclearance," can come in the form of a declaratory judgment from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 30 or through
administrative approval by the Attorney General.31 Regardless of the federal
entity involved, the substantive standard is the same: Section 5 requires a
state or local government to meet its burden32 of proving that a voting
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or [membership in a
language minority group]. 33 Thus, we turn to the manner in which, prior to
Georgia, the Supreme Court had interpreted the two prongs of the test, the
effects prong and the purpose prong.
A. The Effects Prong and the Retrogression Standard
Prior to Georgia, the seminal case involving the Section 5 effects
standard was Beer v. United States.34  Beer involved a redistricting plan
offered for federal approval by the City of New Orleans.35 After the 1960
(k) Any change affecting the right or ability of persons to participate in political
campaigns which is affected by a jurisdiction subject to the requirement of section 5.
28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (2003).
28. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969) (finding that Congress intended
Section 5 to "reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a
minor way").
29. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652-55 (1991) (requiring, with perhaps a minor exception, a
federal court to enjoin implementation of any change that has not received federal approval);
Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269 (1982) (observing that failure to obtain federal approval of a
voting change "renders the change unenforceable"); Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per
curiam) (describing how voting changes are legally ineffective until approved by a federal
authority).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (allowing covered jurisdictions to "institute an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment").
31. Id. (allowing covered jurisdictions to enforce voting changes without a declaratory judgment
if the change is "submitted ... to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection" to the change).
A jurisdiction can implement a change if the Attorney General fails to interpose an objection
within sixty days of receiving submission of the change. Id. A change, therefore, can receive
approval by the Attorney General's silence. See id. However, the Attorney General has the
statutory authority to affirmatively approve a change prior to the sixtieth day. Id. Indeed, the
Attorney General's practice is to always respond to a submission within sixty days (i.e., not to
approve a change by silence) whether or not it is an approval or a rejection of the change. 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.42 ("It is the practice and intention of the Attorney General to respond to each submission
within the 60-day period.").
32. Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D.D.C. 1978) ("In an action for a
declaratory judgment under Section 5, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff."); 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a)
(placing the burden of proof on the jurisdiction that submits the change to the Attorney General).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (emphasis added). The term "language minority group" applies to persons
who are "American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Native, or of Spanish heritage." 42 U.S.C. §
19731(c)(3).
34. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
35. Id. at 133.
Census, the City had five single-member council districts, one of which was
comprised of an African-American total population majority and none of
which was comprised of an African-American voter majority.36 After the
1970 Census, the City sought a declaratory judgment for approval of a
redistricting plan that created two districts with an African-American total
population majority, one of which contained an African-American voter
majority.37
The district court denied approval to this plan because it did not meet
the Section 5 effects standard. 38 The district court found that, for African-
Americans to be proportionally represented, they would have to be able to
elect three city council members.39 Yet the proposed redistricting plan
would only allow African-Americans to elect one councilmember.4 ° So,
largely because of this divergence between proportional representation and
what sort of representation the proposed plan would actually allow African-
Americans, the plan had an impermissible discriminatory effect that
precluded federal approval.4
The Supreme Court reversed.42  In doing so, it created the
"retrogression" test.43 This test only allowed the federal government to deny
approval to a voting change under the effects prong of Section 5 when the
change "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."" In other
words, the federal government had to approve any voting change that did not
make minority voters worse off than they were before the change.45 And,
applying this "straightforward" standard, city officials' redistricting plan
complied with the Section 5 effects prong because the new plan contained an
additional district with an African-American voter majority.46 Thus, the
additional district made the new plan ameliorative, not retrogressive, for
36. Id. at 135.
37. Id. at 136. The City sued in the district court after the Attorney General twice denied
administrative approval. Id. at 130. The City initially redrew the district boundaries and, in doing
so, created two districts that had an African-American total population majority, but did not create
any district with an African-American voter majority. Id. at 135. This initial redistricting plan was
rejected by the Attorney General because the plan diluted African-American voting strength by
"combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white voters in each of the five
districts." Id. City officials then went back to the drawing board and submitted a second plan that
became the subject of the litigation. Id. at 135-36. This second plan also failed to satisfy the
Attorney General who denied approval because the manner in which the districts were drawn had the
"effect of diluting the maximum potential impact of the Negro vote." Id. at 136.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id. at 138.
42. Id. at 143.
43. Id. at 141.
44. Id.
45. Id. (reasoning that a "legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the
'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of Section
5").
46. Id. at 141-42.
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African-American voters.47
So the Beer retrogression test produced a straightforward effects test for
the effects prong of Section 5. If a change resulted in minority voters losing
ground, then the change was not entitled to federal approval.48 On the other
hand, if the change retained the existing voting strength of minority voters or
increased that voting strength, then the change merited federal approval. 49 A
discriminatory purpose (or lack thereof) played no role in the Section 5
effects prong.50 Motive did not matter.
Between the Beer decision in 1976 and the Georgia decision in 2003,
the Supreme Court provided little additional guidance on how to determine
whether a voting change retrogressed minority voting strength.51 Instead,
implementation of the test largely fell upon the Attorney General through the
administrative preclearance process.52  And in the context of redistricting
and districting plans, which arguably comprise the most important voting
changes that the federal government reviews,53 the Attorney General's
47. Id. at 142.
48. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a) (2003).
A change affecting voting is considered to have a discriminatory effect under section 5 if
it will lead to a retrogression in the position of members of a racial or language minority
group (i.e., will make members of such a group worse off than they had been before the
change) with respect to their opportunity to exercise the electoral franchise effectively.
Id; see also City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 (1983) (preclearing voting changes
because they "did not increase the degree of discrimination against [African-Americans]"); Arizona
v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318, 320 (D.D.C. 1995) (describing how "any change which would place a
protected minority group in a position worse than its position [under the existing system] ... does
not merit clearance"); Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining how
"preclearance [must] be denied under the 'effects' prong of Section 5 if a new system places
minority voters in a weaker position than the existing system") (internal quotations omitted).
49. See Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 134; Arizona, 877 F. Supp, at 320; Texas, 866 F. Supp. at 27.
50. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (setting forth the retrogression standard).
51. As one commentator noted in the late 1990s, "Unfortunately, the courts have merely repeated
the retrogression language from Beer without extensive analysis of what constitutes a retrogression.
The Supreme Court typically states simple conclusions as to whether or not a change is a
retrogression. Why a change does or does not constitute a retrogression is unclear." Frederick G.
Slabach, Race, Redistricting and Retrogression in Mississippi After the 2000 Census, 68 MiSS. L.J.
81, 87 (1998); see also Lindsay Ryan Errickson, Note, Threading the Needle: Resolving the Impasse
Between Equal Protection and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2057, 2060
(2001) (observing that, as of 2001, the Supreme Court "ha[d] yet to define clearly how to measure
whether a minority group is going to suffer more severe vote dilution under a proposed districting
plan").
52. Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 rarely seek a declaratory judgment from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia; rather, the overwhelming number of voting changes are
submitted for administrative approval by the Attorney General. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, (Feb. 11, 2000), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/types.htm (noting that the Attorney General reviews 99
percent of preclearance requests); Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice
Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 53, 53 & n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992) (noting how jurisdictions overwhelmingly choose the Attorney General as the
avenue through which to gain approval of voting changes).
53. See Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of Section
implementation of the retrogression test most often amounted to the
following process:
First, the Attorney General reviewed a plan to determine if there
were any districts that allowed minority voters to elect candidates of
choice - -5 4 in general, this amounted to a search for districts where
minority voters controlled the outcome in a way that let them elect a
candidate of their same race or language minority group;55
Second, the Attorney General reviewed Census data to determine if
any of these districts underwent a decrease in minority population;
56
Third, the Attorney General examined voting patterns to determine
if any reductions in minority population would result in the
likelihood that minority voters would no longer be able to elect a
candidate of choice-crucial to this analysis was a determination of
the level of racially polarized voting57 while also taking into account
the comparative registration and turnout rates of non-minority and
minority voters;58
Fourth, if it appeared minority voters had lost a district in which
5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s 80 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
1998).
The drawing of districts from which officials are elected, whether through a redistricting
or the adoption of a districting plan to implement a new district method of election, is one
of the most important voting changes that a jurisdiction may adopt, and the review of
redistrictings and districtings has been an integral part of Section 5 enforcement efforts
from the beginning.
Id.
54. See Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Guidance] ("The
effective exercise of the electoral franchise usually is assessed in redistricting submissions in terms
of the opportunity for minority voters to elect candidates of their choice.").
55. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,481 (2003) (describing the likely electoral outcome in
single-member districts that allow minority voters to elect a candidate of choice).
56. Id. (describing how "the important starting point of any retrogression analysis" was a
comparison of Census statistics in the existing and proposed plans).
57. Id. ("The presence of racially polarized voting is an important factor considered by the
Department of Justice in assessing minority voting strength.").
Racially polarized voting, also known as racial bloc voting, occurs when non-minority voters
strongly support one candidate and minority voters strongly support a different candidate.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n.21 (1986) (plurality opinion) (characterizing racially
polarized voting as occurring when "black voters and white voters vote differently"); see also Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1112-13 (1991) (describing racial bloc voting as occurring when
white voters do not vote for black candidates); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the
Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833,
1854-56 (1992) (discussing racially polarized voting).
58. Guidance, supra note 54, at 5413 (describing how "election history and voting patterns
within the jurisdiction, voter registration and turnout information, and other similar information are
very important to an assessment of the actual effect of a redistricting plan").
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they could elect a candidate of choice (i.e., a retrogression had
occurred), the Attorney General determined whether an alternative
plan could be created that would not result in the elimination of
such a district.
59
After all this, if a plan resulted in an arguable 60 loss of a district in which
minority voters could elect a candidate of choice and a non-retrogressive
plan could be drawn, the Attorney General would deny approval; otherwise
the plan was precleared.6 1
The Attorney General's denial of preclearance to a redistricting plan
submitted by Macon, Georgia, in the mid-1990s, illustrates how this analysis
worked. Macon's existing plan had five double-member districts, three of
which had African-American population majorities. 62 The proposed plan
increased the African-American populations in two of those districts but
decreased the population in the third district63 from one with a majority
African-American voting age population to one with a majority-white voting
age population. 64 This, however, was unacceptable under Section 5 and
approval was denied because there was racially polarized voting65 and
because the reduction was not necessary (i.e., the City could have drawn a
plan that did not reduce the African-American voting age population).66
59. Id. (describing how the Attorney General reviews alternative plans to determine if a viable
remedy exists).
60. I use the term "arguable" because, in close cases, the Attorney General might deny approval
if the submitting authority failed to meet his burden of proving the change did not violate Section 5.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing burden of proof); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 755 (1998)
(describing how "the Attorney General resolves doubts about the racial fairness of a plan against the
State").
61. Guidance, supra note 54, at 5413 ("A proposed redistricting plan ordinarily will occasion an
objection by the Department of Justice if the plan reduces minority voting strength relative to the
benchmark plan and a fairly-drawn alternative plan could ameliorate or prevent that retrogression.").
62. Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights, to Joan W. Harris,
Esq., City Attorney (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Letter from Loretta King] (on file with author)
("Under the existing districting plan, three of the five districts now have substantial black population
majorities."). While the Voting Rights Act nominally requires the Attorney General to make Section
5 determinations, the Attorney General has delegated responsibility for making these determinations
to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2003).
63. Letter from Loretta King, supra note 62 ("The proposed plan would increase the already
substantial black majorities in two of these districts, but would substantially reduce the black
population percentage in District 1.").
64. Id. ("District I would be transformed from one that has a significant black voting age
population majority (58%) to one where whites would constitute a majority of the voting age
residents.").
65. Id. ("In the context of a pattern of racially polarized voting, the plan thus would occasion a
prohibited 'retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise."') (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
66. Letter from Loretta King, supra note 62 ("It is clear that the city council was aware, during
the redistricting process, that alternative plans are available that would correct the population
malapportionment in the existing plan, avoid any retrogression in electoral opportunity for black
So this is the manner in which the Attorney General implemented the
effects prong after Beer.67 If a change would have a negative impact on
minority voters that could be remedied, the change would not receive
approval; otherwise it would pass the retrogression test.68 But for many
years, federal approval or disapproval was not solely governed by
retrogression because the Attorney General's review of voting changes
included two other tools that could be used to deny preclearance: the "clear"
violation of Section 2 and the purpose prong.
B. "Clear" Violations of Section 2 and the Purpose Standard
Beer limited the Section 5 effects prong by only allowing the federal
government to prevent implementation of changes that made minority voters
worse off. 6 9 For this reason, it might have appeared that Section 5 could not
be used as a mechanism to eliminate existing electoral systems, such as at-
large elections or districting plans, that did not provide an adequate
opportunity for minority voters to elect a candidate or candidates of
choice-systems that, in common parlance, resulted in "vote dilution."7 °
Simply put, if the current electoral system inadequately reflected minority
voting strength and the proposed change perpetuated inadequate minority
representation, Section 5 could not be used to compel a jurisdiction to adopt
something better for minority voters.71
However, after Beer, the Attorney General used Section 5 to eliminate
existing vote dilution under two theories. First, Section 5 was used to
prevent implementation of voting changes that resulted in a "clear" violation
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.7 2  Second, Section 5 was used to
prevent voting changes that were adopted with an unconstitutional
discriminatory purpose.73 After all, Beer, in dictum,74 suggested that a non-
retrogressive redistricting plan would violate Section 5 if "the apportionment
voters, and adhere to other traditional districting principles.").
67. Guidance, supra note 54, at 5413.
68. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
70. Vote dilution occurs when an electoral system limits minority voters' ability to "convert their
voting strength into control of, or at least influence with, elected public officials." Richard L.
Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 14 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985). The paradigmatic example of
vote dilution occurs when a cohesive minority voting bloc is submerged within a cohesive bloc of
non-minority voters. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 4 (Chandler Davidson ed.,
1984).
71. SeeBeerv. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996). This standard was not actually employed until after the 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 505-07
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (describing the interplay between the
1982 Amendments and the ability of the Attorney General to deny preclearance on the basis of a
Section 2 violation).
73. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 325 (2000); Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
74. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 338 ("In any event, it is entirely clear that the statement
in Beer was pure dictum.").
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itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
constitution. 7 5
For a number of years, this interpretation and enforcement by the
Attorney General led to large gains in minority political participation.76
However, during the 1990s round of redistricting, the Supreme Court
weighed in on both these theories of enforcement in a pair of cases involving
a redistricting plan adopted by the Bossier Parish School Board, Louisiana.77
These decisions involved the Attorney General's opposition to the Board's
implementation of a redistricting plan because it resulted in a "clear"
violation of Section 2 and because it was adopted with an unconstitutional
discriminatory purpose.78  However, the Supreme Court rejected both of
these bases for denying federal approval to a voting change.79
The first trip to the Supreme Court for the Bossier Parish School
Board's redistricting plan involved the question of whether the federal
government could refuse to approve a plan that would result in a "clear"
violation of Section 2.80 Since 1982, Section 2's core function has been as a
remedy to attack existing minority vote dilution, most often by replacing a
dilutive at-large method of election with single-member districts, at least one
of which would include a majority of minority population. 81 The Attorney
75. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141; see also Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516-18 (D.D.C. 1982)
(three-judge panel), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (finding that, although the redistricting was not
retrogressive, it violated Section 5 because it was not "nondiscriminatory in purpose").
76. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 136 (2000) ( describing how the
Attorney General's vigorous enforcement of Section 5 led to " many new black-majority districts
[being] formed at all levels of government"). Section 5 resulted in an increase in minority
participation because many of the Attorney General's denials of approval were to changes that did
not retrogress minority voting strength. Brief on Reargument for the Federal Appellant at 13,
Bossier, 528 U.S. 320 (Nos. 98-405, 98-406) (stating that, in the 1990s, more than 60% of the
Attorney General's 367 objections were not based on retrogression). True, denial of approval to a
non-retrogressive change would not necessarily guarantee that a jurisdiction would adopt something
better for minority voters. This is because, when the Attorney General prevents implementation of a
change, Section 5 leaves in place the status quo. POSNER, supra note 53, at 87. However, as a
practical matter, other constraints (such as the need to redistrict following release of decennial
Census statistics to comply with the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote) would force
jurisdictions to adopt changes that improved the position of minority voters. Id.
77. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 320; Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 471.
78. The Attorney General initially denied preclearance through the administrative process and
then opposed preclearance in a declaratory judgment action. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at
324-25.
79. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 490; Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 341.
80. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 474.
81. Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second
Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 383-86 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman eds., 1994) (describing how, since the 1982 Amendment of Section 2, "numerous suits"
have been filed against at-large election systems); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEx L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1993) (describing how, after the 1982
Amendment of Section 2, the courts faced "literally thousands of challenges to election schemes that
did not fairly reflect the voting strength of minority communities").
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General, however, primarily used a Section 2 analysis in its Section 5 review
to force jurisdictions that already were using single-member districts82 to
create additional majority-minority districts83 or to compel jurisdictions who
wished to expand existing at-large systems to switch to electoral systems
that would allow minority voters to control the outcome in at least one
single-member district. 84
The Bossier Parish School Board plan presented a situation where the
Attorney General attempted to use Section 2 to force the creation of
majority-minority districts when the jurisdiction already employed single-
member districts.85 Prior to 1990, the Board had twelve districts, but none of
them had a population comprised of a majority of African-Americans.
86
After the 1990 Census revealed those districts to be malapportioned, the
Board adopted a redistricting plan that once again failed to include any
district with a majority of African-American population, even though it
would have been possible for the Board to create two such districts.
8 7
The Attorney General refused to approve the plan because it amounted
to a "clear" violation of Section 2.88 But the Supreme Court rejected a
violation of Section 2 as a valid basis for denying federal approval89 because
the two provisions of the Voting Rights Act were designed to attack two
separate evils: Section 2 was designed to eradicate existing dilutive voting
practices while Section 5 was designed to combat changes to existing
systems that would result in a retrogression of minority voting strength. 90
To import Section 2 into Section 5 would impermissibly "shift the focus of
[Section] 5 analysis from nonretrogression to vote dilution," "call into
question more than 20 years of precedent interpreting [Section]5," and
"increase further the serious federalism costs already implicated by §5.''9'
With that, the Court closed the book on one avenue the Attorney General
had used to deny approval to non-retrogressive voting changes.9 2
82. Section 2 applies to districting plans as well as at-large elections. Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 40 (1993).
83. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights, to Tiare B.
Smiley, Esq., Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991) (objecting,
in part on Section 2 grounds, to failure to draw additional majority-minority districts); Letter from
John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights, to Mark H. Cohen, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, State of Georgia (Jan. 21, 1992) (objecting, in part on Section 2 grounds, to
failure to draw additional majority-minority districts).
84. See, e.g., Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1995).
85. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 475-76.
86. Id. at 474.
87. Id. at 475.
88. Id. at 475-76.
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 479-80.
91. Id. at 480.
92. It should be noted that denials of federal approval based solely on the Section 2 rationale
were relatively rare. The Section 2 rationale often worked in concert with a theory of discriminatory
purpose. See Brief for the Federal Appellant at 40, Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471
(1997) (Nos. 98-405, 98-406) ("The facts relevant to vote dilution in violation of Section 2 are
usually also relevant to purpose under Section 5."); see also, e.g., Letter from Deval L. Patrick,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights, United States Department of Justice, to Hubbard T.
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A few years later, the Board's redistricting plan returned to the Court.93
The issue to be decided this time around was whether preclearance could be
withheld if a voting change was adopted with a discriminatory, though non-
retrogressive, purpose.94 The question, put another way, was this: Could the
federal government deny approval to a voting change adopted with an
unconstitutional discriminatory purpose? The Court answered the question
in the negative,95 deciding the case almost purely as a matter of statutory
interpretation.96 In doing so, it rejected the dictum from Beer in which the
Court had appeared to grant the Attorney General and the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia the power it was now denying.97
Instead, the Court held that federal approval could only be denied to changes
with a retrogressive purpose. 98
The result of the Bossier decisions was that federal review of voting
changes was left with little except for the retrogressive effects test.99 Sure,
retrogressive purpose, the functional equivalent of unconstitutional purpose,
remained a factor in federal review because a purpose to make minority
voters worse off would easily violate the Equal Protection Clause;' ° yet, as
expected, retrogressive purpose has played only a very limited role in
Saunders IV, Special Counsel, Crosthwait Terney (Dec. 19, 1994) (objecting on both Section 2 and
purpose grounds to proposed method of election and districting plan for the City of Quitman,
Mississippi). In fact, the Attorney General had predicted that denials of federal approval based upon
Section 2 would be rare when issuing the administrative guideline allowing for the denial of federal
approval based on a violation of Section 2. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 487 (Jan. 6, 1987) ("Our experience indicates
that ... it would be exceedingly rare that a jurisdiction would be able to satisfy its burden of proof
imposed by Section 5 concerning a voting procedure... and still face the prospect that the same
change violates amended Section 2.").
93. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
94. Id. at 322-23.
95. Id. at 341 (holding that "[Section] 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan
enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose").
96. Id. at 328 (holding that the "language of [Section] 5 leads to the conclusion that the 'purpose'
prong of [Section] 5 covers only retrogressive dilution"); id. at 336 (asserting that the most important
reason for the Court's decision was the "language of [Section] 5"); id. at 341 ("In light of the
language of [Section] 5 and our prior holding in Beer, we hold that [Section] 5 does not prohibit
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.").
97. Id. at 335; see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
98. It is possible that the retrogressive purpose standard only applies to voting changes that have
the potential for vote dilution and not to changes that have the potential to deny minority voters
access to the ballot (i.e., changes in polling places and registration locations). See Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 922 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing types of voting practices that
implicate ballot access). The Supreme Court has only definitively applied its holding in the second
Bossier case to voting practices that could dilute minority votes. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S.
at 337-38. This Article assumes this standard applies to all voting changes.
99. Alaina C. Beverly, Note, Lowering the Preclearance Hurdle: Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 695, 699 (2000) (describing how the practical impact of the Bossier
cases left retrogressive effect as the only means by which the federal government could prevent
implementation of a voting change).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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determining whether a voting change receives federal approval. 10 In the
three years that followed the Court's second Bossier decision, the Attorney
General denied approval to only eleven changes in which retrogressive
purpose played any kind of role-and in every one of those denials, actual
retrogressive effect was also involved.10 2  So, after the Bossier decisions,
Section 5 mostly amounted to a search for voting changes that had a
discriminatory impact, leading to a problem for anyone attempting to justify
the statute under the Court's latest idea of what constitutes an appropriate
exercise of Congress's enforcement power.
101. In its submission to the Court in the second Bossier, the Solicitor General's office made this
prediction:
Appellee's submission, however, would reduce the purpose prong of Section 5 to a trivial
matter, limited to preventing enforcement of those voting changes that are intended to
cause retrogression but are destined to fail in doing so (since any new voting practice that
actually "will * * * have the effect" of retrogression will be denied preclearance under
the effect prong.) The Court should reject a construction of Section 5 that would render
its purpose prong so insignificant.
Brief on Reargument for the Federal Appellant at 13, Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320
(2000) (Nos. 98-405, 98-406).
102. Between January 24, 2000, (the day the second Bossier was decided) and January 24, 2004,
the Attorney General denied preclearance on 34 occasions (not counting continued denials of
preclearance). United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Objection
Determinations (including text of objection letters), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/obj-
activ.htm. Eleven of those preclearance denials involved retrogressive purpose. Letter from Ralph
F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to John B. Duggan, Esq. (Nov. 2,
2001) (objecting to redistricting plan in Greer, South Carolina); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to J. Lane Greenlee, Esq. (Dec. 11, 2001)
(objecting to cancellation of general election in Kilmichael, Mississippi); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to William D. Barr, Ed.D., Superintendent of
Schools, Monterey County Office of Education (Apr. 1, 2002) (objecting to change to at-large
elections for the Chualar Union Elementary School District, California); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to William D. Sleeper, County Administrator,
and Fred M. Ingram, Chairperson, Board of Supervisors (Apr. 29, 2002) (objecting to redistricting
plan for Pittsylvania County, Virginia); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, to Lisa T. Hauser, Esq., and Josd de Jestis Rivera, Esq. (May 20, 2002)
(objecting to redistricting plan for the State of Arizona); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Charles T. Edens, Chairperson, County Council (June
27, 2002) (objecting to redistricting plan in Sumter County, South Carolina); Letter from Ralph F.
Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to The Honorable Bill Robertson,
Mayor, and H. Gray Stothart II, Coordinating & Development Corporation (July 2, 2002) (objecting
to redistricting plan for Minden, Louisiana); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, to Darvin Satterwhite, Esq., County Attorney (July 9, 2002)
(objecting to redistricting plan for Cumberland County, Virginia); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., Esq., Senior Assistant
Attorney General, South Carolina (Sept. 3, 2002) (objecting to redistricting plan for the Union
County School District, South Carolina); Letter from J. Michael Wiggins, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, to Al Grieshaber, Esq., City Attorney (Sept. 23, 2002) (objecting to
redistricting plan for Albany, Georgia); Letter from Andrew E. Lelling, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, to Walter C. Lee, Superintendent, Parish School Board, and B.D.
Mitchell, President, Parish Police Jury (Dec. 31, 2002) (objecting to redistricting plan for DeSoto
Parish School District, Louisiana).
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II. WHY THE PRE-GEORGIA RETROGRESSION STANDARD PRESENTED A
PROBLEM FOR SECTION 5's FUTURE
Today, the Section 5 effects prong provides the statute's primary
mechanism of enforcement. But, prior to Georgia, the effects prong was just
that-a pure effects test. In contrast, the Constitution protects citizens from
the adoption and maintenance of purposefully discriminatory voting
procedures. 10 3  This distinction presented little problem for Section 5
decades ago when it was easily upheld as a proper remedy under Congress's
enforcement power.' °4 Now, however, new challenges confront Congress's
ability to exercise its enforcement power and, vicariously, to the continuing
vitality of Section 5. Recent Court decisions have changed the standard for
assessing the propriety of Congress's use of its enforcement power, resulting
in a significant curtailing of Congressional authority.10 5 Why this new
limitation? On one level, it stems from the Court's unwillingness to allow
Congress to use its enforcement power to legislate a complete shift in
constitutional norms. 10 6 And the paradigm of such a complete shift would
appear to occur when Congress substitutes a pure effects test for a
constitutional purpose test.
A. The Court's Upholdings of Section 5 as a Proper Exercise of
Congressional Enforcement Power
The Court has twice undertaken an extensive consideration of whether
Section 5 represents a valid exercise of Congress's enforcement power.'0 7 In
103. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion).
104. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
105. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how
the Court's recent decisions amount to a "significant and lasting cutback" of Congress's enforcement
power); see also Kimberly E. Dean, Note, In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of Prophylactic
Antidiscrimination Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697, 725 (2002)
(noting how the Court's recent decisions represent a "clear attempt to diminish Congress's
[enforcement] power").
106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. The Court also addressed the constitutionality of Section 5 on two other occasions, but
discussion of the issue in those cases was relatively concise. In Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
526 (1973), the Court used a single sentence to reaffirm Section 5's constitutionality. Id. at 535
("And for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v. Katzenbach .... we reaffirm that the Act
is a permissible exercise of congressional power under [Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.").
In Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999), the Court likewise made quick work in
reaffirming the statute's constitutional validity, writing, "[i]n short, the Voting Rights Act, by its
nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion, however, and
our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to the burdens that the Act imposes."
Id. at 284-85.
The decision in Lopez post-dates some of the Court's recent decisions that limit Congress's
enforcement power. However, Lopez did not feature a head-on challenge to Section 5's
constitutionality using these most recent precedents, as the State did not argue for application of
those precedents in its brief. State Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 30-34, Lopez; see also John
South Carolina v. Katzenbach'0 ° and City of Rome v. United States,' 9 the
Court, with relatively little dissent," ° upheld Section 5.'" In both these
cases, the Court approved the statute by granting great deference toward
Congress's use of its power. 12
In Katzenbach, the State of South Carolina argued that Congress could
only use its enforcement power to forbid actual constitutional violations." 3
The Court, however, rejected the idea that Congress could be straight-
jacketed to merely outlawing constitutional violations because the text and
structure of the Fifteenth Amendment showed that Congress was "chiefly
responsible for implementing the rights created" by that Amendment'"' and
that Congress had "full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition against racial discrimination in voting."' 15 For this reason, the
Court applied the deferential rational basis test to Congress's exercise of its
enforcement power.' 1 6 This meant that any "appropriate" legislation would
be sustained, 1 7 and the "inventive" Section 5 remedy was appropriate
legislation because it represented a necessary response to "widespread and
persistent discrimination in voting.'18
More than a decade later, in City of Rome, the Court had to directly
decide whether Congress could use its enforcement power to ban voting
changes that had only a discriminatory effect." 9 The City conceded that
Congress had the power to enforce the constitutional prohibition against
racial discrimination in voting, but contended that the constitutional right to
Matthew Guard, Comment, "Impotent Figureheads"? State Sovereignty, Federalism, and the
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey County and City of
Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 357 (1999) (describing how Lopez "does not thoroughly
discuss the framework that exists after Flores").
108. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
109. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
110. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Justice Hugo Black was the lone dissenter. 383 U.S. at
355. In City of Rome v. United States, Justices Louis Powell, Potter Stewart, and William Rehnquist
formed the Court's minority. 446 U.S. at 159.
111. See supra notes 108-09.
112. See infra notes 117, 126.
113. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327 (describing "South Carolina's argument that Congress may
appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms-
that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must
necessarily be left entirely to the courts").
114. Id.at 326.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 324 ("As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.").
117. Id. at 327. In reaching its holding, the Court invoked Chief Justice John Marshall's classic
words: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)).
118. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-28. The Court opened its opinion with an extended discussion
of this Nation's lengthy history of blatant racial discrimination in voting. Id. at 308-15.
119. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (describing the City's argument that
"[Section] 5, to the extent that it prohibits voting changes that have only a discriminatory effect, is
unconstitutional").
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be free of racial discrimination in voting only included a right to be free of
purposeful discrimination." 0 Congress, on the other hand, had passed a law
that protected minority voters from practices that merely had a
discriminatory effect. 2' This, according to the City, Congress did not have
the power to do.'
22
The Court rejected the City's contention,'23 holding that Congress could
use its enforcement power to prohibit government action that would not
violate the Constitution. 24 Once again the Court applied a rational basis test
in its review of Section 5, allowing Congress to pass any "appropriate"
statute attacking voting discrimination. 2 5  And Section 5's ban on voting
changes with a racially discriminatory effect remained appropriate because it
was rational for Congress to conclude that such changes created a risk of
purposeful discrimination when those changes were made by state and local
governments with a history of voting-related racial discrimination.
26
While a few dissents were penned in City of Rome, 127 Justice William
Rehnquist's thoughts merit attention. In his view, changing from a purpose
standard to an effect standard amounted to a Congressional shift of the
substantive constitutional right. 2 8  He argued that such a shift violated
separation of powers principles because it allowed Congress to define
constitutional norms. 129 This view of the nature of Congress's enforcement
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. As the Court put it:
Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by the Fifteenth Amendment.
The appellants contend that the Act is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress'[s]
power to enforce that Amendment. They claim that [Section] 1 of the Amendment
prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination in voting, and that in enforcing that
provision pursuant to [Section] 2, Congress may not prohibit voting practices lacking
discriminatory intent even if they are discriminatory in effect.
Id.
123. Id. ("We hold that, even if [Section] I of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not,
pursuant to [Section] 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.").
124. Id. at 176.
125. Id. at 177 (holding that "[iut is clear, then, that under [Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate [Section] 1 of the
Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are appropriate")
(internal quotations omitted).
126. Id. at 177 (holding that "Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral
changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting
create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a
discriminatory impact").
127. Id. at 193 (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Thus, the result of the Court's holding is that Congress
effectively has the power to determine for itself that this conduct violates the Constitution.").
129. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing how the majority opinion calls into question
"previously well-established distinctions between the Judicial Branch and the Legislative or
Executive Branches of the Federal Government").
power did not prevail in City of Rome. However, after seventeen years and a
title change, the general sentiments he outlined were adopted by a majority
of his colleagues, albeit in a case that did not involve Section 5.
B. Section 5's Problem: The Court's Recent Decisions
So Section 5 would appear to be clearly constitutional under the Court's
precedents. The problem is that those precedents, while not expressly
overruled, seem to have considerably less value after the Court's more
recent decisions. 130  In 1997, the Court handed down City of Boerne v.
Flores.13 ' This case, and several subsequent decisions, 32 place greater
restrictions on Congress's exercise of its enforcement power. 133 No longer
does the deferential rational basis standard apply. 34  Instead, the Court
analyzes Congress's exercise of its enforcement power under the stricter
congruence and proportionality standard; 35 a standard designed, in part, to
prevent Congress from completely redefining the substance of constitutional
rights. 136
Boerne involved the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 3 7  That Act was passed in
response to the Court's shift in its Free Exercise Clause doctrine. Basically,
the Court moved to a doctrine that made it more difficult for religious
individuals and groups to prove religious discrimination. 38  Dissatisfied
with the Court's doctrinal shift, Congress passed RFRA in an effort to
reinstate the old constitutional standard that was much more accommodating
130. As one commentator has noted: "[I]t is surely doubtful that the Court as presently constituted
would have upheld the statute[ ] in .. . City of Rome .... One may wonder whether the Court is
paying lip service to the earlier opinions while, as a practical matter, relegating them to the junk
pile." Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric Mission, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 60 (2001).
131. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
132. See supra note 9.
133. Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34
CONN. L. REV. 981, 1030 (2002) (describing how the Court recently narrowed the scope of
Congress's enforcement power); Day, supra note 9, at 366-67 (describing a "blitzkrieg of decisions
by the Rehnquist Court interpreting and significantly narrowing the scope" of Congress's
enforcement power).
134. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1127, 1134-58 (describing how the Court's recent decisions shifted the standard of review of
legislation passed under the enforcement power from rational basis scrutiny to rigorous scrutiny);
Dean, supra note 105, at 728 (describing how Boerne moved the Court's review of legislation
passed under the enforcement power from "the traditional rational relationship test ... to a stricter
congruence and proportionality test.").
135. Dean, supra note 105, at 728.
136. Cole, supra note 10, at 57 (noting that under the Boerne standard "Congress is not free to
take actions that impose requirements beyond the substantive constitutional standard as the Supreme
Court has enforced it itself.").
137. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,512 (1997).
138. The Court went from a doctrinal test that asked whether a law "substantially burdened a
religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling government
interest" to a test that allowed "neutral, generally applicable laws [to] ... be applied to religious
practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest." Id. at 513-14 (citing
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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of religion- 139 in essence to replace an intent test with an effects test. 4 °
According to Congress, the ability to pass RFRA emanated from its
enforcement power.'14
In deciding whether RFRA was a proper enactment under the
enforcement clause, the Court acknowledged that Congress could ban some
governmental conduct that was not itself unconstitutional. 42 As the Court
observed: "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress'[s] enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes
into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.
' 143
The Court found support for this proposition by harkening back to its
decisions that endorsed voting rights remedies of similar ilk.' 44
But then the Court shifted gears, explaining that there are limits to
Congress's power to ban constitutional government action, 45 and that the
limits prevent Congress from changing the nature of a constitutional right.
"Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be
said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,'
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.'
' 46
Thus, Congress may only pass laws that are congruent and proportional to
139. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
140. Cole, supra note 10, at 46 ("RFRA ... prohibited state action that had a burdensome effect
on religious exercise where the Court had interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require a showing
of intentional discrimination.").
141. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516. As the Court wrote, "It is said the congressional decision to
dispense with proof of deliberate or overt discrimination and instead concentrate on a law's effects
accords with the settled understanding that [Section] 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] includes the
power to enact legislation designed to prevent, as well as remedy, constitutional violations." Id. at
517. At the outset of the opinion, the Court viewed RFRA as shifting the standard for proving
religious discrimination from a purpose standard to an effects standard. However, toward the end of
the opinion, the Court characterized RFRA as being something less than an effects standard. Id. at
535 (describing RFRA's substantial basis test as "not even a discriminatory-effects or disparate-
impact test"). This is somewhat puzzling because not only is it internally inconsistent, but it seems
likely that any law that has a substantial burden on a religious practice would seemingly have a
disparate impact against a particular religion.
142. Id. at 518.
143. Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
144. The Court wrote:
For example, the Court upheld a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting
requirements ... despite the facial constitutionality of the tests .... We have also
concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress'[s] power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens these measures
placed on the States.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
145. Id. ("It is also true, however, that '[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is
not unlimited."') (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
146. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing that
"Congress lacks the ability independently to define or expand the scope of constitutional rights by
statute.").
the problem of unconstitutional discrimination. 47 This is because, under the
Constitution, the Judicial Branch has the "duty to say what the law is,'
148
and such authority is needed to "maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance."' 149  RFRA, however, changed the constitutional standard;
thus it represented an unconstitutional exercise of the enforcement power.
So under this new doctrine, Congress lacks the power to completely
redefine the standard for finding a violation of a constitutional right. 50 Yet,
after the Court's decisions in the Bossier cases, Section 5's primary function,
the retrogression test, did just that.' 5' The Court has defined the
constitutional right to vote as one that prevents purposeful discrimination in
voting, with the Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting "purposefully
147. Id. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
148. Id. at 536 (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
149. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
150. The rule that separation of powers does not allow Congress to completely redefine the
standard for finding a constitutional violation remains unchanged by the Court's recent decisions
upholding two remedies as proper exercises of Congress's enforcement power-the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) as applied to
access to the courts. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (upholding Title II of the ADA as
applied to access to the courts); Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976 (2003)
(upholding the FMLA). Neither the FMLA nor Title II amounts to a violation of separation of
powers by making a wholesale change in a constitutional standard.
The FMLA does not violate separation of powers because it does not facially contravene the
Court's idea of what equal protection means in the context of gender discrimination. To the Court,
protection from gender discrimination means nondiscrimination absent an "important governmental
objective[]" that "[must] 'not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females."' Hibbs, 123 S. Ct at 1978 (quoting United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). The FMLA facially adheres to this notion of nondiscrimination
by providing a remedy to all employees regardless of gender. Id. at 1982-83 (describing the FMLA
as setting "a minimum standard of family leave for all eligible employees, irrespective of gender")
(emphasis in original). In other words, the FMLA might have implicated separation of powers
concerns if it had only provided a remedy for one particular gender, but because the FMLA treated
both genders equally, it conformed to the Court's idea of equal protection. In contrast, Section 5
appears to facially contravene the Court's idea of nondiscrimination (absent a "compelling interest"
and "narrow tailoring") in the context of racial discrimination by providing a remedy only to a
particular class of persons (i.e., certain racial and language minorities). See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 221 (1995) (describing the standard for the Court's review of government
action that is facially race-based).
Title II did raise some separation of powers concerns because it provides a special remedy to a
particular class of persons-the disabled-without a showing of discriminatory purpose. Lane, 124
S. Ct. at 2006 (describing the ADA as requiring "special" accommodations) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). However, the underlying standard of Title II, as interpreted by the Court, does not
simply outlaw each and every practice that has a discriminatory effect on persons with disabilities.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993 (noting that "Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to
make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities") (emphasis added). Rather, Title II
sets up a system where liability is not triggered by a mere discriminatory effect, but is triggered by a
failure to make "reasonable modifications" to provide access to the courts. Id. Indeed, the Court
itself read Title II to be relatively consistent with its own doctrine. Id. at 1994 ("This duty to
accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, 'within the
limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard' in
its courts.") (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). In contrast, the pre-Georgia
Section 5 retrogression test required any and all reductions in minority voting strength to be
remedied. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text (describing Attorney General's application
of the retrogression test).
151. See supra Part I.A.
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discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to
vote"'152 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting voting systems that are
"conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial...
discrimination.' ' 5 3 In contrast, the retrogression test reached voting changes
that purely had a discriminatory effect.
54
There may, however, be some reason to think that the Court's recent
precedent presented no problem for the Section 5 retrogression test. This is
because almost all of the cases decided using the Court's congruence and
proportionality doctrine have spoken glowingly of the remedies Congress
passed under the Voting Rights Act, 155 so maybe voting rights remedies are
grandfathered in under the pre-congruence and proportionality standard.'
56
152. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Myers v.
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379 (1915) (requiring invidious motivation for Fifteenth Amendment
claim); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-65 (1915) (requiring invidious motivation for
Fifteenth Amendment claim).
153. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)
(alteration in original)). The Court has recognized claims of vote dilution under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the Court has yet to decide whether a vote dilution claim may be pursued under the
Fifteenth Amendment. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993); but cf. Bolden, 446 U.S. at
66 (implying vote dilution claim is not sustainable under Fifteenth Amendment) with Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (implying vote dilution claim is sustainable under Fifteenth
Amendment).
154. Under the Court's Equal Protection doctrine the government can now implement a facially
race-based remedy in certain contexts without a showing of purposeful discrimination. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-31 (2003) (upholding an affirmative action program without
showing a history of purposeful discrimination). Moreover, the Court appears willing to allow a
greater use of race by government actors in the redistricting process-again without any showing of
discriminatory purpose. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (disallowing the use of
race only when it predominates in the redistricting process). Thus, it could be argued that Section 5
conforms with the Court's Equal Protection doctrine because race was used in a context where the
Court would allow the use of race absent a showing of purposeful discrimination, See id.
However, even in the contexts where government seems to have more leeway to engage in
race-based activity without a showing of purposeful discrimination, the use of race must be narrowly
tailored. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (describing the need for narrow tailoring when a government
engages in race-based action). It is likely the Section 5 retrogression test violated the Court's idea of
narrow tailoring because simply counting up the number of districts where minority voters could
elect a candidate of choice and requiring the automatic retention of all such districts could be viewed
as a reflexive use of race akin to a quota system. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 269-76
(2003) (finding an automatic numerical enhancement for minority college applicants to lack the
narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny); see also Katz, supra note 16, at 2376 n.203 (describing
how Georgia reflects the Court's desire to restrict the mechanical use of race in government
decision-making).
155. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999)
(describing how "City of Boerne discussed with approval the various limits that Congress imposed in
its voting rights measures"); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526-27 (1997) (describing the
Court's approval of "new, unprecedented remedies" to attack voting discrimination); see also Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 735-39 (looking favorably upon voting rights remedies); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74 (looking favorably upon voting rights remedies); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (distinguishing voting rights remedies in a positive light).
156. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743, 749 (1998) (suggesting that the Court may be reaffirming previous voting rights remedies
"under an implicit grandfather clause").
Maybe, too, the Court's doctrine only applies to legislation passed under the
Fourteenth Amendment and not to voting rights legislation passed under the
Fifteenth Amendment,157 or perhaps the Court will only apply an extremely
soft version of congruence and proportionality to voting rights remedies
because voting is a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."'
15 8
Better yet, even assuming the Court's doctrine applies to voting rights
remedies, maybe the pre-Georgia retrogression test already served as an
adequate proxy for a finding of purposeful discrimination. 59 This could be
because the jurisdictions covered by Section 5 have an actual history of
purposeful voting-related discrimination, tro and it is eminently logical to
presume discriminatory purpose exists when a jurisdiction with a history of
purposeful voting discrimination adopts a voting change that results in a
discriminatory impact. 16 1 In a nutshell, this is the Court's rationale from
City of Rome. 161
157. This is because all the cases in which the Court has used its new Enforcement Power doctrine
have involved Congressional remedies passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment power and
Section 5 has been previously upheld as a remedy properly passed pursuant to the Fifteenth
Amendment power. Compare supra note 9 (listing cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment)
with supra note 6 (listing cases upholding Section 5 as a proper remedy under the Fifteenth
Amendment). The Court, however, has often equated Congress's enforcement power under the two
amendments. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 n.8 (describing Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment as "virtually identical" to that of the Fifteenth Amendment); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18
(describing Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment as "parallel" to that under the
Fifteenth Amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (describing Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment as "similar" to that under the Fifteenth Amendment).
Moreover, the Court has never held that the Fifteenth Amendment protects against vote dilution. See
supra note 153.
158. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,561-62 (1964); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) ("[T]he political franchise of voting is ... a fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights."). For a lengthier discussion of the idea that voting rights remedies may
get different treatment under congruence and proportionality, see Pitts, supra note 20, at 268-77.
159. Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179,
1196-97 (2001) ("Limiting Section 5's effect prong to retrogressive effect arguably restricts its reach
to conduct for which invidious intent is the likely explanation.").
160. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (describing how Section 5 covers
jurisdictions with a "demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting"); United
Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1977) (plurality opinion) (describing
how jurisdictions became covered by Section 5 "whenever it was administratively determined that
certain conditions which experience had proved were indicative of racial discrimination in voting
had existed in the area"); see also Timothy G. O'Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982:
The New Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1983) (describing the
coverage formula as "rest[ing] on the rationale that the conjunction of low voter registration or
turnout and the use of a literacy test.., establishes a presumption that discrimination exists in the
voting processes.").
161. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177.
162. Maybe, too, the Section 5 effects test takes aim at actual purposeful discrimination because,
at least in the vote dilution context, retrogression cannot occur without the existence of racially
polarized voting. See Thornburg v. Gingles,*478 U.S. 30, 62 (1986) (plurality opinion). However,
this theory is subject to criticism on an evidentiary, doctrinal, and practical level. The evidentiary
criticism would be that the traditional statistical analysis used to prove racially polarized voting does
not account for the multiplicity of reasons why voters cast their ballots (i.e., voters might be casting
their ballots for reasons unrelated to racial discrimination). Id. at 63 (noting that "the reasons black
and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of [Section] 2 [of the
Voting Rights Act]"); see also Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan
Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2512 n.23 (1997). The doctrinal criticism would be that a private
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However, a major problem with this line of reasoning is that every year
we get further and further from much of the actual, blatantly purposeful
discrimination that serves as the predicate for covering a jurisdiction under
Section 5. These jurisdictions were deemed to be places where purposeful
discrimination occurred because, during the 1960s and 1970s, a literacy test
or other discriminatory device was used and there was statistical evidence of
depressed voter participation. 63  True, almost a century of blatant
discrimination occurred between the conclusion of the Civil War and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act,' 64 but a generation has passed since much
of the most obvious and egregious discrimination occurred.
Another more practical problem emanates from the Court's
disinclination to embrace a generalized history of discrimination as a proxy
for the implementation of race-based remedies.165  The Court does not look
favorably upon the use of race-based remedies to counteract "societal"
discrimination; 66 instead, the Court requires a compelling showing of a
history of discrimination and a very tight nexus between that history and the
race-based remedy being used.167  Section 5 would seem to contravene this
individual's decision to cast a vote for racially discriminatory reasons is not "state action"
attributable to the government for the purposes of enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
an individual's act of voting does not qualify as governmental action). The practical argument
would be that Georgia itself seems to de-emphasize the prominence of racially polarized voting to
the Section 5 retrogression standard. Compare infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text
(describing the importance of the levels of racially polarized voting to the district court's decision)
with infra note 190 (describing the unimportance of racially polarized voting to the Supreme Court's
decision).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). The coverage formula applies Section 5 to places where (1) the
Attorney General determined a test or device was used as of a certain date (November of 1964,
1968, or 1972) and (2) the Director of the Census determined that, as of a certain date (November of
1964, 1968, or 1972), less than 50% of the voting age population was registered or less than 50% of
the registered voters cast ballots in the November (of 1964, 1968, or 1972) presidential election. Id.
164. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 181-82; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
337 (1966) (describing how there was "nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment").
165. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (recognizing, in
the context of a minority contracting program, that "a generalized assertion that there has been past
discrimination ... provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the
injury it seeks to remedy"); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 498 (2003) (describing how the Rehnquist Court's equal
protection doctrine seems "less concerned with history and social structure"); J. Morgan Kousser,
Voting Rights Struggles in Georgia, 3 ELECTION L.J. 53, 60 (2003) (criticizing the Court's failure to
acknowledge Georgia's history of voting-related racial discrimination in finding the State's post-
1990 Congressional redistricting plan to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander).
166. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking AffirmativeiAction, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 60, 69 (2004) (describing how the Court does not think race-based remedies "can be justified
as compensation for past societal discrimination").
167. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (noting that a state must have a "strong basis in
evidence" in order to justify the use of a race-based remedy to "eradicat[e] the effects of past racial
discrimination"); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982 (1996) (plurality opinion) (finding that a
state may only remedy discrimination when it can show "specific, 'identified discrimination"' and a
289
principle by using a coverage formula that represents only a very generalized
finding of purposeful discrimination. For example, while the coverage
formula mostly ensnares places like Alabama and Mississippi where
purposeful racial discrimination most definitely occurred, it also covers
places like New Hampshire where it seems utterly impossible to make a case
that discrimination in voting was prevalent enough to require the stringent
Section 5 remedy. 168 Moreover, the coverage formula is not jurisdiction
specific-for instance, cities and school districts can get swept up because
the county they lie within is covered; and, to engage in a race-based remedy,
the Court seems to strongly prefer evidence specific to each jurisdiction.1
69
Section 5, however, does have an escape hatch for jurisdictions that
were wrongfully covered or where discrimination no longer exists.170 This
escape mechanism is known as a "bailout," and it can be obtained by
securing a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.' 71 Yet, bailout has been tough to achieve, as only a
handful of jurisdictions have successfully obtained a declaratory judgment
under the existing bailout standard. 72 In addition, not all jurisdictions can
bail out; generally, cities and school districts are ineligible unless the county
in which they are located institutes a successful bailout action; 173 and a
county may not bailout unless all its subjurisdictions would also meet the
bailout standard.' 74 For these reasons, the Court might view Section 5 as
overbroad in its coverage of places without an actual or recent history of
voting-related discrimination.
The bottom line is that the Court has shifted its enforcement power
doctrine away from the rationale explicated by the majority in City of Rome
and has more or less adopted Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case. For
this reason, the Court's congruence and proportionality doctrine presented a
genuine problem for the Section 5 effects test. Georgia, however, resolved
that problem.
III. GEORGIA AND THE NEW STANDARD FOR RETROGRESSION
Prior to Georgia, Section 5 primarily involved a review of whether a
voting change left minority voters in a worse position than prior to adoption
"'strong basis in evidence"' to conclude that race-based action is necessary) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996)).
168. See supra note 26 (listing covered jurisdictions).
169. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (noting that "a state
or local subdivision.., has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its
own legislative jurisdiction") (quoting J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 491-92) (emphasis added).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a).
171. Id.
172. See U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/types.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004),
(listing jurisdictions that have bailed out under the standard adopted by Congress in 1982).
173. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 169 (1980).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)-(F) (requiring jurisdictions seeking bailout to prove that certain
voting rights violations have not occurred "within its territory").
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of the change. 75 This was a pure effects test. But Georgia changed all that.
While nominally the "retrogression" test has been retained, its substance
involves an entirely new standard. For the first time, the Section 5 effects
prong involves more than just a review of whether a voting change has a
negative impact on minority voters; it involves a number of additional
evidentiary factors, resulting in an inquiry into the "totality of the
circumstances.' 76
A. Georgia at the District Court
In Georgia, the State sued for preclearance of its post-2000 census
redistricting plan for the Senate, a governing body that elects fifty-six
members from single-member districts. 77  Using 2000 census data, the
existing districting plan had thirteen districts with a total African-American
population majority, twelve of which had an African-American voting age
population majority. 78 The proposed plan also contained thirteen districts
with a total African-American population majority, all thirteen of which had
an African-American voting age population majority. 179
After reviewing the statewide impact of the proposed plan, the Attorney
General mounted a narrow challenge to changes in Senate Districts 2, 12,
and 26, alleging that African-American population reductions in those
districts resulted in an impermissible retrogressive effect. 8° District 2 had
an African-American voting age population of almost 60% in the existing
plan and an African-American voting age population of just over 50% in the
proposed plan;' 8' District 12 had an African-American voting age population
of just over 55% in the existing plan and an African-American voting age
population of just over 50% in the proposed plan; 82 and District 26 had an
African-American voting age population of about 62% in the existing plan
and an African-American voting age population of about 51% in the
proposed plan.i8 3
175. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
176. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,480 (2003).
177. 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 55 (D.D.C. 2002). The State also sought preclearance of its
Congressional and State House redistricting plans. Id. at 29. The Attorney General did not oppose
implementation of these plans and, after making its own independent review, the district court
agreed. Id. at 97.
178. Id. at 55.
179. Id. at 56.
180. Id. at 72 ("The Attorney General eventually identified only the Senate redistricting plan as
objectionable, and, in particular, proposed Senate Districts 2, 12 and 26.").
181. Id. at 56-57. Georgia asserted that the African-American voting age population was 50.31%;
the United States contended that it was just under 50% at 49.81%. Id. at 57.
182. Id. at 59.
183. Id.at6l.
The district court began its analysis of whether or not the proposed plan
violated the Section 5 effects prong by attempting to delineate the legal
standard for judging retrogression. 84  The court struggled to enunciate a
standard because, despite years of implementation of Section 5, the Supreme
Court had never defined retrogression nor "engaged in any detailed
discussion of what constitutes an 'effective exercise of the electoral
franchise' by minority voters."' 8 5  After acknowledging the lack of clear
guidance, the district court concluded that the only means to assess
retrogression was to determine "whether a proposed change would leave
minority voters in a 'worse' position than under the existing plan."'' 86 But
such a standard merely restated the definition of the word retrogression and
gave little insight into how to assess whether a new plan was, in fact, worse.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the proper way to assess
retrogression was to use the same standard that had been implemented for
many years by the Attorney General. 8 7 The district court essentially looked
solely at whether districts that provided minority voters with a chance to
elect candidates of choice had undergone a reduction in the percentage of
minority population. 88 Then, the district court assessed the level of racially
polarized voting to determine whether any of those reductions were likely to
result in the elimination or diminishment of minority voters' ability to elect a
candidate of choice.' 89  The district court summarized its analysis and
subsequent holding as follows:
[T]he more we find evidence of racial polarization in the disputed
Senate districts, the more we are persuaded that Georgia has failed
to meet its burden of proving that the reductions in African
American populations in those districts and in other majority-
minority districts has not lessened the ability of its African
American voters to effectively exercise their collective right to
vote. 1
90
184. Id. at 73-78.
185. Id. at 74; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
186. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
187. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text (discussing how the Attorney General
implemented the retrogression test).
188. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (describing the analysis as "asking whether the elimination of
a majority-minority district-or the reduction of African American population in such a district-is
actually retrogressive").
189. Id. at 76. The Court wrote:
In a Section 5 case, this court's analysis-while limited to the question of retrogression-
is fact-intensive and must carefully scrutinize the context in which the proposed voting
changes will occur. In particular, the level of racially polarized voting, or the degree to
which there is a correlation between the race of a voter and the way in which the voter
votes, sheds light on whether a decrease in districts' minority populations will produce an
impermissibly retrogressive effect.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
190. Id. at 78; see also id. at 31 ("Where there is evidence of racially polarized voting, a
redistricting plan that reduces African American votes in a district with no offsetting gains elsewhere
raises the specter of impermissible retrogression."); id. at 76 ("In particular, the level of racially
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In its particularized assessments of the reductions of minority population
in Districts 2, 12, and 26, the district court found "credible [statistical]
evidence that suggests the existence of highly racially polarized voting in the
proposed districts."' 9' This fact "compelled" the district court "to conclude
that the evidence of racial polarization suggests the likelihood of
retrogression."'' 92 In addition, the district court found lay witness testimony
regarding racial politics and polarization in the proposed districts served to
polarized voting, or the degree to which there is a correlation between the race of a voter and the
way in which the voter votes, sheds light on whether a decrease in districts' minority populations
will produce an impermissibly retrogressive effect.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); id.
("However, if racially polarized voting persists in an area and its electoral history demonstrates that
minority voters' preferences diverge greatly from those of non-minority voters, a decrease in [black
voting age population] may translate into a lessening of minority voting strength.").
In scrutinizing the plans presented- for preclearance, we must therefore consider whether
the State has met its burden of demonstrating that the dispersion of African American
voting age population throughout the districts is not so affected by racial bloc voting that
it will have a negative impact on the opportunities available to Georgia's African
American voters to make their collective voices heard.
Id.; id. at 77-78 ("In particular, if voting patterns are not marked by racially polarized voting or other
barriers to the effective exercise of minority voters' franchise, dilution may have little or no effect on
the ability of those voters to elect preferred candidates.").
As explained above, in the present case, racial polarization is critically important because
its presence or absence in the Senate districts challenged by the United States goes a long
way to determining whether or not the decreases in [black voting age population] and
African American voter registration in those districts are likely to produce retrogressive
effects.
Id. at 84.
191. Id. at 88; see also id. at 70-71 (describing the statistical evidence of racially polarized voting
in Senate Districts 2, 12, and 26). At the district court, the State and the Attorney General disputed
the type of statistical evidence relevant to determining whether retrogression occurred. Id. at 64-71
(discussing statistical evidence proffered by the State and the Attorney General). The State offered
probit analysis aimed at showing what percentage of African-American voting age population in a
district produces a 50% chance that African-American voters' candidate of choice will win-the so-
called "point of equal opportunity." Id. at 64-68. The Attorney General offered a regression
analysis, a more traditional statistical analysis used in voting rights cases, that used aggregate data in
an attempt to infer the severity of racial bloc voting. Compare id. at 69 (describing Supreme Court's
past reliance on regression analysis) with id. at 65 (describing how no court had ever relied on probit
analysis in reviewing a redistricting plan).
In the end, the district court relied heavily on traditional regression analysis and more or less
rejected probit analysis. Id. at 80 ("The court rejects the notion that the 'point of equal opportunity'
is in any way dispositive of the Section 5 inquiry."); id. at 88 (describing how the regression analysis
"suggests that Senate races in the proposed districts will be marked by racially polarized voting").
While this battle of statistics played a prominent role in the district court's opinion, it did not play a
major role in the outcome at the Supreme Court, as the Court barely mentioned the parties' statistical
evidence. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,486 (2003). Georgia noted that:
Georgia introduced evidence showing that approximately one-third of white voters would
support a black candidate ... and that the United States' own expert admitted that results
of the statewide elections in Georgia show that there would be a very good chance
that... African American candidates would win election in the reconstituted districts.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court, however, appeared to reject the basic premise of probit
analysis by holding that Section 5, unlike Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, was not a test of
"equal opportunity." Id. at 477-80; see also id. at 475.
192. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
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buttress the statistical analysis that proved these districts violated the Section
5 effects standard. 93
While finding that retrogression resulted from the reductions of minority
population in these districts, the district court rejected as irrelevant some of
the State's proffered evidence.1 94  The State contended that the near
unanimity of African-American legislators' support for the plan
demonstrated that no retrogression was present.195 But the district court
found that "the legislators' support is, in the end, far more probative of a
lack of retrogressive purpose than of an absence of retrogressive effect."' 96
The State also contended that the plan was not retrogressive because it was
designed to elect members of the Democratic Party, 197 and most African-
American voters'9 8 and all African-American legislators were Democrats. 99
This, argued the State, showed non-retrogression because minority voters
and minority legislators would have their legislative influence preserved. 200
But the district court rejected these contentions as without precedent,
asserting there was "no authority that supports the proposition that a political
party's overall success, and accompanying positions of power for minority
legislators, should be considered in assessing minority voters' effective
exercise of their electoral franchise. '2 '
So the district court engaged in a standard Beer retrogression analysis,
treading on familiar ground. 02 The Supreme Court, however, soon would
move the retrogression test in a new direction.
193. Id.; see also id. at 58-59 (describing lay witness testimony about racially polarized voting in
Senate District 2); id. at 60-61 (describing lay witness testimony about racial politics in Senate
District 12); id. at 61-62 (describing lay witness testimony of racially polarized voting in Senate
District 26); id. at 89-91 (describing lay witness testimony as to whether the changes in Senate
Districts 2, 12, and 26 were retrogressive).
194. See id. at 89.
195. Id. at 88-89. The proposed plan was adopted with the support of every African-American
state legislator, save two. Id. at 55.
196. Id. at 89.
197. Id. at 41 (describing testimony from a State official that the goal of the redistricting was to
"maintain the number of minority districts that we presently had, but at the same time maintain and
increase the number of Democratic seats").
198. Id. at 92 (describing testimony that the "great majority of the African American voters in the
State of Georgia, 90 percent or more tend to vote the Democratic way").
199. Id. at 41 ("All of the African American legislators in the Georgia General Assembly are
Democrats.").
200. Id. at 91 ("Georgia asks the court to equate African American voters' electoral strength with
the success of the Democratic Party at the polls."); id. at 92 (describing Georgia's argument that
"legislative influence" in terms of chairpersonships of committees and subcommittees should be a
factor in the retrogression test); id. (describing testimony that "were Republicans to be the majority
in the Senate, Democratic African Americans would lose several positions as committee chairs").
The Senate's majority leader and rules committee chair were African-American. Id. at 42. In
addition, seven or eight other African-American Senators were eligible to chair committees. Id.
201. Id. at 92; see also id. at 93 ("The court emphatically rejects the notion that a plan that
protects Democratic incumbents and a Democratic majority is necessarily a plan that does not
retrogress with respect to African American voting strength.").
202. District Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer dissented in part. Id. at 102. He expressed doubt that a
plan that reduced the "probability" of electing minority voters' candidate of choice in three out of
fifty-six districts could be considered retrogression for that "reason alone." id. at 102-03
(Oberdorfer, J., dissenting). In his view, the legal test for retrogression was whether the proposed
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B. The Supreme Court's Creation of a New Test for Retrogression
The Supreme Court vacated.2°3 In its opinion, the Court nominally
retained the retrogression test, reasserting its view that federal approval
should be denied to any voting change that would "lead to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise. ' '2°4 However, for the first time ever, the Court defined
the meaning of the phrase "effective exercise of the electoral franchise. 205
The Court provided this definition by creating a "totality of the
circumstances" test, 206 asserting that an assessment of whether a change
retrogresses a minority group's effective exercise of the electoral franchise
depended on "an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the
ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, [and] the extent
of the minority group's opportunity to participate in the political process.,
20 7
Retrogression, thus, is not solely about "the comparative ability of a
minority group to elect a candidate of its choice., 20 8 Instead, retrogression
involves an assessment of the totality surrounding the ability of a minority
group to elect candidates of choice in "safe" and "coalition" districts,2 9 and
the ability of a minority group to participate in the political process by
assessing gains and losses in the number of "influence" districts, the support
or opposition of minority incumbent legislators, and the increases or
decreases in relative positions of power of those legislators.21 °
A comparison of the number of "safe" and "coalition" districts in the
benchmark and proposed plans represents the first part of the analysis.
plan preserved a "fair," "equal," or "reasonable" opportunity to elect candidates of choice. Id. at
116-17 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 126-27 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting) ("It is my view
that [Section] 5 does not prevent a state from adopting a redistricting plan, with the blessing of
African-American legislators, that reduces 'packed' concentrations of black voters so long as it
preserves equal or fair opportunities for minorities to elect candidates of choice."). And looking at
the statistical evidence and the lay testimony from three prominent African-American elected
officials, Judge Oberdorfer saw no reason to believe the proposed plan did not preserve an equal
opportunity for minority voters to elect candidates of choice. Id. at 103-04 (Oberdorfer, J.,
dissenting).
Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote a concurring opinion that harshly criticized Judge
Orberdorfer's dissent. Id. at 97-102.
203. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,490 (2003).
204. Id. at 479 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 141 (1976)).
205. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 479 (allowing that the Court had "never determined the meaning of
'effective exercise of the electoral franchise').
206. Id. at 480 (describing how a court should "assess[ ] the totality of the circumstances"); id. at
484 (asserting that "a court or the Department of Justice should assess the totality of circumstances
in determining retrogression under [Section] 5").
207. Id. at 479. The Court also recognized that any assessment of retrogression involved
examining the "feasibility of creating a non retrogressive plan." Id. This Article will leave this
aspect of the totality test alone because Georgia provides no meaningful discussion of this factor.
208. Id. at 480.
209. Id. at 480-86.
210. Id.at482-85.
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These districts would likely provide different types of success rates for
minority candidates of choice and different types of representation for
minority voters. The safe districts "virtually guarantee" a minority group's
preferred candidate of choice.2 1  With such districts being very likely to
result in more "descriptive" representation because the winning candidate
will probably be a member of the same minority group as the district's
212voters. In contrast, coalition districts provide the "opportunity" to elect a
minority group's candidate, though such districts create some "risk that a
minority group's preferred candidate may lose. 213  Coalition districts,
therefore, allow for more "substantive" minority representation because a
larger number of districts might be created that would allow minority voters
to coalesce with non-minority voters in order to achieve the electoral
aspirations of the minority group.2t 4 The bottom line being that Section 5
leaves States with the "flexibility to choose one theory of effective
representation over another., 2
15
The second part of the analysis encompasses a hodgepodge of factors,
including a comparative (between the existing and proposed plan)
assessment of "influence" districts, what incumbent minority legislators
think of the new plan, and whether the plan maintains or increases legislative
positions of power for those minority legislators.1 6 Thus, in assessing
retrogression, one must look at whether the "new plan adds or subtracts
'influence districts' where minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the
electoral process. ' 217  And, to assess the "comparative weight of these
influence districts, it is important to consider 'the likelihood that candidates
elected without decisive minority support would be willing to take the
minority's interests into account.' 21
8
211. Id. at 480 (defining a safe district as one where "it is highly likely that minority voters will be
able to elect the candidate of their choice").
212. Id.at481.
213. Id. The Court defined a coalition district as a "district[] in which it is likely-although
perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan-that minority voters will be able to elect
candidates of their choice." Id. at 480.
214. Id. at 481. As the Court noted:
[T]here are communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with
voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a
single district in order to elect candidates of their choice. Those candidates may not
represent perfection to every minority voter, but minority voters are not immune from the
obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is
not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American
politics.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)).
215. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 482; see also id. at 480 ("Section 5 does not dictate that a State must
pick one of these methods of redistricting over another.").
216. Id. at 482-85.
217. Id. at 482.
218. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 100 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
In fairness, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between a "coalition" district and an "influence"
district. In a coalition district, minority voters combine with non-minority voters to elect a candidate
of the minority voters' choice. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 481. In an "influence district," minority voters
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The support of incumbent minority legislators, and the protection of
those legislators, also plays a "significant, though not dispositive" role in
assessing whether a plan diminishes the minority group's opportunity to
participate in the political process . 9 If minority legislators support the plan,
then that provides evidence that the proposed plan continues to ensure the
same amount of minority participation in the political process as the existing
plan.220  This results from incumbent legislators' knowledge of voting
patterns and whether the proposed plan, when combined with those patterns,
will lead to a decrease in minority voters effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.221
Finally, one must consider the "comparative positions of legislative
leadership, influence, and power" for legislators in the existing plan's
majority-minority districts when determining whether the proposed plan
reduces the minority group's ability to participate in the political process.222
One must examine whether the proposed plan retains those districts that
can play "a substantial, if not decisive, role" but cannot elect a candidate of choice. 1d. at 482. But
if minority voters play a decisive role then that means they are electing a candidate of choice, right?
My guess is that the difference lies more with electoral outcomes for candidates who are of the
same race or ethnicity as the minority voters in the district. In an influence district, a non-minority
candidate (i.e., a candidate who is not a member of a minority group) will virtually always be
victorious, but will get decisive support from minority voters. Id. In a coalition district, a non-
minority candidate and a minority candidate will both have a decent chance to win an election. Id. at
481.
This view seems consistent with the comments of Professor Richard H. Pildes in an article that
was favorably mentioned by the Georgia Court. Id. at 482-83. Professor Pildes wrote:
This Article will assume for now, consistent with the emerging data, that black
candidates can be regularly elected, at least in some places, from "coalitional" rather than
"safe" majority-black districts. By "coalitional" districts, I mean ones in which the black
registered voter population is less than 50% (typically 33%-39%) and the rest of the
registered voters are non-Hispanic whites. I treat this as a distinct conceptual category of
district, one that differs from safe districts and from "influence districts." Influence
districts, debated in the 1990s but not legally required, are ones "in which a minority
group has enough political heft to exert significant influence on the choice of candidate
though not enough to determine that choice." The concept of influence is nebulous and
difficult to quantify. In contrast, coalitional districts do not present these same
difficulties. A coalitional district is defined in terms of actual electoral outcomes; such a
district can be specified quantitatively as a district with a significant presence, though not
a majority, of black voters, but that has a fifty-fifty probability of electing the preferred
candidate of those black voters. Coalitional districts require, by definition, interracial
support to elect a candidate that the black community prefers. Safe districts differ on this
front because voters of a single race-minority voters--constitute a voting-eligible
majority. If the black community prefers a black candidate in such a district, that
candidate can be elected without any white support.
Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights
in the 2000s, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1517, 1539-40 (2002) (footnotes and quotations omitted).
219. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 483-84.
220. [d.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 482.
have resulted in the election of the most powerful minority legislators.223
For example, one would examine whether the proposed plan protected
minority legislators who chaired committees. If the proposed plan retains
those legislative positions of power, that evinces a lack of retrogression. 4
C. The Supreme Court's (Rough) Application of Its New Standard
After setting forth this new framework for retrogression, the Court
provided a crude application of its new standard to the Georgia State Senate
plan. The Court criticized the district court for failing to consider all the
relevant factors in determining whether the plan was retrogressive,225
faulting the district court's narrow focus on reductions of minority
populations in "safe" districts while ignoring increases in African-American
voting age population in other districts.226 In addition, the district court was
faulted for ignoring the support of minority legislators and the impact the
new plan had on maintaining those legislators' influence.
2 7
The Court criticized the district court for not taking a broad view of the
various increases and decreases in African-American population in the plan
as a whole. 228 This criticism proceeded along two lines-one quantitative,
the other qualitative. The quantitative aspect of this criticism centered on
the district court's narrow focus on three districts in which it was
"marginally less likely that minority voters [could] elect a candidate of their
choice" while "ignor[ing] the evidence of numerous other districts showing
an increase in black voting age population. 229 For example, using 2000
223. Id. at 483.
224. Id. at 483-84 ("Maintaining or increasing legislative positions of power for minority voters'
representatives of choice, while not dispositive by itself, can show the lack of retrogressive effect
under [Section] 5."). There may also be another level of analysis regarding preservation of minority
legislators' power. This additional level of analysis may focus upon whether the plan represents an
overall attempt to retain majority power for the political party to which the powerful minority
legislators belong. For example, it may be permissible to reduce the level of minority voting
strength in the district of a powerful minority legislator if that reduction enables the election of other
members of the minority legislators' political party. Put more concretely, it may be permissible to
reduce the electoral chances of a Democratic African-American House Majority Leader if that
reduction is used to bolster the election of Democrats elsewhere who will enable the African-
American majority leader to retain that powerful legislative status.
225. Id. at 485 ("The District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined
whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.").
226. Id.
227. The Court summarized the district court's mistakes as:
First, while the District Court acknowledged the importance of assessing the statewide
plan as a whole, the court focused too narrowly on proposed Senate Districts 2, 12, and
26. It did not examine the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in
many of the other districts. Second, the District Court did not explore in any meaningful
depth any other factor beyond the comparative ability of black voters in the majority-
minority districts to elect a candidate of their choice. In doing so, it paid inadequate
attention to the support of legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority
districts and the maintenance of the legislative influence of those representatives.
Id. at 485-86.
228. Id. at 486.
229. Id. at 485-86.
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Census data, the number of African-American majority voting age
population districts increased by one, the number of districts with between
30% and 50% African-American voting age population increased by two,
and the number of districts with between 25% and 30% African-American
voting age population increased by two.230  So, in the Court's view, the
district court failed to consider whether decreases in "safe" districts were
offset with increases elsewhere. 3
The qualitative criticism emanated from the district court's failure to
properly credit the "other evidence that Georgia decided that a way to
increase black voting strength was to adopt a plan that 'unpacked' the high
concentration of minority voters in the majority-minority districts. ' 232 The
Court took note of the plan's creators' "strategy", which was to "unpack[]
minority voters in some districts to create more influence and coalitional
districts. 233 Indeed, this "goal" of unpacking minority voters was intended
to "increase blacks' effective exercise of the electoral franchise in more
districts."
23 4
The Court also emphasized the relevance of minority legislators' views
of the plan and the potential of the proposed plan to maintain or enhance
minority legislators' positions of power.235  Thus, the Court favorably
viewed the testimony of Senator Robert Brown, an African-American
legislator who helped devise the proposed plan, who averred that the plan's
goal was to maintain or increase black voting strength and, relatedly, the
strength of the Democratic Party majority in the Senate.236 Also favorably
viewed was the testimony of a civil rights legend, Congressman John Lewis,
who said that the proposed plan enhanced African-American power by
putting Democratic legislators into office who would be responsive to
230. Id. at 487. The Court noted that the increases in African-American voting age population
would be even greater if the proposed plan was compared to the existing plan using 1990 Census
data. Id. Under this comparison, the proposed plan increased the number of African-American
voting age majority districts by three, and increased by five the number of districts with African-
American voting age populations between 30% and 50% by five. Id. In fact, applying the 1990
Census data to Senate Districts 2, 12, and 26, showed that District 2 dropped from about 59%
African-American voting age to just over 50%; District 26 dropped from about 53% to about 51%;
and District 12 actually increased from about 47% to about 51%. Id.
It is unclear why the Court included a comparison with 1990 Census data as the Court
recognized that the comparison between the proposed plan and the existing plan uses the most recent
Census statistics. Id. at 506. My guess is that the review of 1990 data provides just another factor to
use in the "totality" analysis.
231. Id. at 487 ("And regardless of any potential retrogression in some districts, [Section] 5
permits Georgia to offset the decline in those districts with an increase in the black voting age
population in other districts.").
232. Id. at 486.
233. Id. at 487.
234. Id. at 488-89 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 482-85.
236. Id. at 489.
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African-American voters' concerns. 237 Such testimony, in the Court's mind,
enhanced the potential for finding that the proposed plan merited federal
approval. 8
But this application of the new retrogression test was merely rough, not
decisive. While the Court wrote that Georgia's Senate plan was "likely"
entitled to federal approval, the Court declined to finally resolve the case in
favor of the State.239 Instead, the Court remanded the case so that the district
court could conduct a more thorough analysis of the plan under the new
standard.24 °
IV. GEORGIA As A SOLUTION FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DEFICIENCIES OF SECTION 5
The Section 5 effects test had separation of powers problems under the
Court's recent decisions because it resulted in a wholesale change of the
constitutional standard for voting discrimination from a purpose test to a
pure effects test. Georgia, however, has shifted Section 5 away from a
singular focus on discriminatory effects. 24 1 No, retrogression has not been
morphed into a constitutional purpose test, but Georgia does move the
Section 5 retrogression test close enough to the constitutional standard to
eliminate any separation of powers problem. While nowhere in Georgia
does the Court explicitly state an intent to move the retrogression standard
toward compliance with its recent precedents limiting the scope of
Congress's enforcement power, the opinion provides ample evidence for this
view. Namely, the Georgia Court:
1) finds as relevant to retrogression, evidence that seems more
germane to an analysis of discriminatory purpose rather than
discriminatory effect;
242
237. Id.
Congressman Lewis testified that "giving real power to black voters came from the kind
of redistricting efforts the State of Georgia has made," and that the Senate plan "will give
real meaning to voting for African Americans" because "you have a greater chance of
putting in office people that are going to be responsive."
Id.
238. Id. at 489-90.
239. Id. at 487 ("Given the evidence submitted in this case, we find that Georgia likely met its
burden of showing nonretrogression."); see also id. at 489 ("Other evidence supports the
implausibility of finding retrogression here.").
240. Id. at 491 (remanding to the district court to examine the facts under the new retrogression
test). The case was ultimately dismissed as moot because Georgia's plans were found to be in
violation of the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d
1320, 1324-25, 1357-58 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that Georgia's statewide plans violated one
person, one vote).
241. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 484.
242. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 484.
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2) explicitly places value on the motive and purpose of Georgia's
legislators when discussing whether the Senate plan meets the new
retrogression standard;243 and
3) establishes a totality of the circumstances test for Section 5, thus
creating an analogy to the totality of circumstances test for Section
2,24 the latter of which appears to be constitutional, even after the
Court's recent decisions.
A. The Structure of the New Retrogression Test and the Court's Rough
Application of that Test to Georgia's Senate Plan
Some of the evidentiary factors that Georgia adds to the retrogression
test look more like factors that would help to determine whether a
discriminatory purpose was at work. The new retrogression standard starts
with an inquiry into whether minority voters retain the ability to elect a
candidate of choice in either a "safe" or "coalition" district.245  Nothing
much new here. The Section 5 effects test, as historically applied by the
Attorney General, previously looked at these types of districts to the
exclusion of other factors.246 But all the other additional circumstances to
consider-minority legislators' views of the proposed plan, an analysis of
influence districts, and maintenance of minority legislators' power-appear
to be an attempt to determine whether the voting change does something
more than just result in a statistically provable discriminatory effect. 247
The consideration of the views of minority legislators is the new factor
that most clearly seems to put an element of purpose into the Section 5
effects test. After all, the Georgia district court had rejected the support of
minority legislators as evidence of non-retrogression because that support
provided an indication as to whether the plan was adopted with a
discriminatory purpose rather than whether the plan was adopted with a
243. Id. at 503.
244. Id. at 480.
245. Id.
246. The only potentially new wrinkle on this front is the question of how fungible "safe" and
"coalition" districts are. Federal approval has traditionally been denied when a state or local
government reduces a "safe" district to a "coalition" district. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451,
479 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (three-judge panel) (recognizing that "Georgia's alteration of its safe districts
would have been problematic at best in the 1980s and early 1990s."). In other words, federal
approval has been denied when a district goes from virtually guaranteeing the election of minority
voters' candidate of choice to a district in which there is a risk minority voters' candidate of choice
might lose. It remains unclear whether moving one safe district to a coalition district will prove an
impermissible retrogression. Put a bit differently, if a state or local government down-grades a safe
district to a coalition district, does it have to create at least one additional coalition district or several
additional influence districts in order to comply with the new retrogression test?
247. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 485-86.
discriminatory effect.248 Indeed, if the effect of a plan on minority voting
strength is all that matters, minority legislators' support or opposition should
generally not matter. Statistical analysis provides all the evidence needed
except perhaps in close cases or where statistical analysis cannot be
performed. But pure statistics do not explain the legislative process and the
motives of elected officials; the views of minority legislators do explain
those things. And widespread minority support for the change seemingly
gives an imprimatur that purposeful discrimination was not at work in the
adoption of the voting change.249
The inquiry into "influence" districts also contains an element that
seems to be a search for discriminatory purpose. At first glance, though, this
is not self-evident because influence districts might seem to be just a straight
effects test search for whether the minority population has increased or
decreased in districts that contain a critical mass of minority voters but do
not contain enough minority voters to provide any reasonable opportunity to
elect a candidate of choice.2 5 0  However, the review of influence districts
involves more than just a search for whether the numbers have gone up or
down. 5 It involves an inquiry into whether legislators elected from those
districts will take into account minority interests. Considered another
way, the inquiry into influence districts will look to whether candidates
actively seek minority votes and, more importantly, after seeking those
votes, whether the candidates assist their minority constituents or vote in
favor of issues minority voters overwhelmingly support.2 5 3 In essence, this
amounts to a purpose-type analysis because it will look at whether
legislators elected with minority support are just using those voters to get
elected without providing some tangible benefits once assuming office. 5
The role of minority legislators in adopting the voting change also
contains elements of a purpose-type inquiry. The new test puts emphasis on
retaining the ability of minority legislators to "pull, haul, and trade" in the
political process and to exert their legislative influence. 2 5 Georgia never
explicitly ties this idea of participation in the political process to the
adoption of the voting change itself, but it is probably not too great a stretch
to read the opinion this way.2 56 So, when minority legislators have an active
248. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
249. Of course, the absence of a discriminatory purpose cannot be completely proven because
legislators elected from "safe" districts approved of the change. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482. 499 (1977) ("Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to
presume as a matter of law that human beings of one [identifiable] group will not discriminate
against other members of their group."). These legislators could just act in their own self-interest
without concern for their minority constituents.
250. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 487 (citation omitted).
251. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
254. Accord City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73-74 (1980) (plurality opinion) (describing
how elected officials' discrimination against minorities in municipal employment and the dispensing
of public services could amount to an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose).
255. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 483.
256. See id.
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hand in pulling, hauling, and trading during the redistricting process and in
cutting the political deals, then that serves as evidence a redistricting plan
does not retrogress minority voting strength. However, if the redistricting
process excludes minority legislators, then that would tend to provide
evidence that the plan does retrogress minority voting strength and was
intended to discriminate against minority voters.257
Of course, all these factors arguably are measurable in the same way the
old retrogression test measured whether minority voters could elect
candidates of choice from "safe" and "coalition" districts by focusing on the
prevalence of racial bloc voting and the existence of a viable remedy. 8
Influence districts can be measured by the increases or decreases in minority
percentage; the responsiveness of legislators elected from influence districts
can be measured by an analysis of legislative voting records; the support of
minority legislators can be measured by reviewing the roll call vote on the
voting change; and minority legislators' positions of power can be measured
by the likelihood of them being safely returned to office.
But these new factors are not so easily measured, and this fact has been
pointed out by others. 9 Moreover, even if each of the factors is measurable
to some extent, it is unclear how these factors inter-relate in the ultimate
"totality of the circumstances" finding. For example, what if minority
legislators overwhelmingly support a plan that results in the loss of a safe
district with no corresponding gain in coalition or influence districts? Or,
what if all the safe districts are retained, influence districts are obliterated,
and minority legislators overwhelmingly oppose the plan? Obviously, the
possible iterations are endless. Thus, even assuming each factor to be
empirically measurable, the ultimate totality calculation will be inherently
unempirical.26 °
257. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 518 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge panel) (finding
discriminatory purpose in part because "[b]lacks, solely because of their race, were excluded from
the final [legislative] decision-making process").
258. See supra Part I.A.
259. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 33 (2d ed. Supp. 2004).
The new standards set forth in [Georgia]... involve measuring things for which either (1)
there are no hard data (e.g., how much influence does a majority-minority member have in a
legislature?) or (2) no data at all (e.g., did the state decide to decrease the number of majority-
minority districts because it had adopted a particular theory of representation or because it
wanted to discriminate against minority voters?).
Id.; Pildes, supra note 218, at 1539 (describing the concept of the influence district as "nebulous and
difficult to quantify").
It is also worth mentioning that some of these factors may be unique to statewide redistricting
plans where there are many different types of districts. County, city, and school district plans are
less likely to have substantial numbers of "safe," "coalition," or "influence" districts. In fact, many
of these plans are likely to have nothing more than one or two "safe" districts.
260. See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 494 (Souter, I., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion
creates a standard for retrogression that is "practically unadministrable").
So the new retrogression test now facially features an examination of
factors that are unquantifiable and that seem to be searching for indicia of
discriminatory purpose as well as discriminatory effect. 26' That provides
evidence, albeit inconclusive, that the Section 5 effects test has shifted to
something closer to a discriminatory purpose-type inquiry. However, this
evidence becomes less inconclusive upon consideration of the Court's
explicit invocation of motive in its rough application of the new test to
Georgia's Senate plan.262
The motive of the decision-makers who created the Georgia Senate plan
figures prominently in the Court's rough assessment of whether the Senate
plan violated the Section 5 effects standard.263 The Supreme Court chided
the lower court for ignoring evidence that Georgia's lawmakers decided to
increase African-American voting strength by adopting a plan that unpacked
high concentrations of minority voters. 264 Aside from an explicit invocation
of the motive behind the plan, the Court's analysis, thus, appears to elevate
intangible motives over more provable statistical impact because there may
not be any room to second-guess this decision. Motive matters because the
decision of Georgia's lawmakers seems to matter in-and-of itself regardless
of whether the facts on the ground would show that, in practice, minority
voters lost traction in some districts. 65
Even more directly, the Court's analysis of the Senate plan emphasized
the importance of the Georgia lawmakers' "goal" in creating the plan.266 As
the Court noted:
The testimony from those who designed the Senate plan confirms
what the statistics suggest-that Georgia's goal was to "unpack" the
minority voters from a few districts to increase blacks' effective
exercise of the electoral franchise in more districts ....... These
statistics also buttress the testimony of the designers of the plan
such as Senator Brown, who stated that the goal of the plan was to
maintain or increase black voting strength and relatedly to increase
the prospects of Democratic victory.267
261. Georgia probably only represents the beginning of the new retrogression test. It is the first
case to explicate the new standard and this new standard was not proffered in any party's brief to the
Supreme Court. It seems likely then that, by creating a totality test, the Court has issued an
invitation to the Attorney General and the covered jurisdictions to put other types of relevant
evidence into play.
262. See id. at 484-88.
263. Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 21, 35 (2004) ("The linchpin of the Court's analysis of the Georgia plan was not a prediction
about election results at all, but rather its repeated assertion that Georgia had acted in good faith.").
264. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 486-87.
265. See id. at 487.
266. Id. at 488-89.
267. Id. (emphasis added).
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The importance of the "goal" of the legislature also was underscored in the
Court's statement of the case's facts.268
With these statements, the Court seems to be looking at motive in order
to determine whether the plan retrogresses minority voting strength.
Crediting several times over the non-discriminatory "goal" of Georgia's
African-American and white lawmakers to maintain or increase African-
American voting strength seems indistinguishable from crediting them with
adopting a plan that was free of discriminatory purpose or motive. Indeed, if
Section 5 were still an effects only test, why would the "goal" matter? An
effects test determines statistically whether or not the proposed plan was
worse; as such, an inquiry into the legislature's "goal" would be pointless to
a pure analysis of discriminatory effects.
In fairness, the Court never explicitly endorses discriminatory purpose
as a factor to consider in its new retrogression test.269 And advocates for
minority voters who fear the insertion of any constitutional purpose-type
evidentiary standard into the Section 5 effects test would surely counter that
the Court cannot be adding, through Georgia, an element of discriminatory
purpose when just a few years ago the Court explicitly removed
discriminatory purpose as a basis for denying federal approval to a voting
change.270 For this reason, interpreting Georgia as adding an element of
purpose back into Section 5 squarely places it at odds with recent Court
precedent.27'
As a matter of logic and policy, this argument makes eminent sense. If
discriminatory purpose has been deemed an irrelevant ground for denying
federal approval, then evidence of a lack of discriminatory purpose should
be an equally irrelevant ground for granting federal approval. It would be
seemingly inconsistent to allow evidence of motive to operate as a one-way
ratchet that always works in favor of state and local governments, not to
mention that using motive in this manner would seem to be unfair to
minority voters.272
268. Id. at 469 ("The goal of the Democratic leadership-black and white-was to maintain the
number of majority-minority districts and also increase the number of Democratic Senate seats.");
Id. ("The Vice Chairman of the Senate Reapportionment Committee, Senator Robert Brown, also
testified about the goals of the redistricting effort.") (emphasis added in both).
269. See id at 488-89.
270. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); see also Karlan, supra note 263, at 35
("The Court's opinion seemed to reimport into the section 5 inquiry the kind of free-floating inquiry
into legislative intent that Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II) had sought to
eliminate.") (footnote omitted).
271. Compare Georgia, 539 U.S. at 487, with Bossier Parish Sch. Bd, 528 U.S. at 341.
272. One way for the Court to explain this inconsistency logically would be for the Court to adopt
the thesis of this Article. Namely, that the Section 5 effects test would be unconstitutional without
moving it closer to the constitutional purpose standard. However, that still does not really explain
why the Court would have removed discriminatory purpose as a means for denying preclearance
because leaving that standard in Section 5 would not have called into as much question the
constitutionality of the statute. My suspicion is that the Court probably would not object to a statute
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But in the real world, logic does not govern, judges do. And the current
legal reality consists of a federal judiciary led by a Court majority that has a
low tolerance for race-based remedies and a low tolerance for federal laws
that dictate what states must do. Of course, Section 5 touches squarely upon
both of these concerns, making it the quintessential statute for the current
Court to take aim at. So, in the real world, it makes perfect sense for the
Court to issue two decisions just a few years apart that are incongruous in
their treatment of evidence (or lack thereof) of discriminatory purpose.273
The cases can easily be synthesized because both decisions make it more
difficult for the federal government to force state and local officials to
engage in race-conscious redistricting.
Aside from arguing that the Court should not re-insert a purpose test to
the disadvantage of minority voters when it recently removed a purpose test
that was advantageous to minority voters,274 advocates for minority voters
might take exception to the insertion of any whiff of a purpose standard into
the Section 5 effects test on a plain language theory. Congress wrote a
statute outlawing discriminatory effects in voting in certain jurisdictions and
the plain language of the statute must be respected.275 The Court should not
re-fashion the statutory language in a manner not intended by Congress.
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation and due deference for the
judgment of Congress as a co-equal branch of government, advocates for
minority voters would likely be correct. Congress created an effects test in a
day-and-age when it appeared the Court was willing to cede such power to
Congress and the Court should probably respect Congress's judgment and
reliance on prior Court precedent.276 However, interpreting Section 5 so
literally could have serious negative long-term consequences for minority
voters because a literal interpretation of the statute might make it
unconstitutional under the recent Court doctrine.277 Voting rights advocates
that provided a standard that allowed a federal court or the Attorney General to deny preclearance
when a change was made with an unconstitutional purpose, but that a majority of the Court believed
the Attorney General was not actually implementing a purpose standard but was instead engaging in
an analysis that sought to maximize black voting strength. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
924-27 (1995) (criticizing the Attorney General's "policy of maximizing majority-black districts");
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (criticizing the Attorney General's "policy of maximizing
majority-black districts"); Katz, supra note 159, at 1180-81 (stating that "the Bossier Parish cases
may best be seen to reflect the Court's concern about institutional overreaching by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) ... [as the] Rehnquist Court has long been convinced that DOJ has systematically
abused its authority in the preclearance process... ").
273. Compare Georgia, 539 U.S. at 487, with Bossier Parish Sch. Bd, 528 U.S. at 341.
274. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (describing how the purpose test resulted in
the elimination of dilutive electoral systems).
275. 42 U.S.C. §1973 (2000). Steve Pershing has criticized federal courts that seem to take a
similar approach to Section 2 (i.e., courts that seem to be inserting a purpose standard into the
Section 2 "results" test). Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal
Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1195-97 (2001).
276. See Primus, supra note 165, at 495-96 (describing how, in the mid-1970s, the Court implied
"that Congress could use disparate impact standards in antidiscrimination statutes if it so chose").
277. In a way, adding an element of purpose to the Section 5 effects test amounts to the Court's
reinterpretation of the statute to avoid a constitutionally suspect interpretation. See Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 293 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("'[Wihere a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise
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might want to be wary of winning the statutory interpretation battle and
losing the constitutionality war.278
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"') (quoting
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
278. Perhaps, though, the Georgia test has little to do with racial motive, but instead is just about
keeping the judiciary out of the political process and the federal government out of the business of
state and local governments. Put another way, maybe the Court does not care about moving Section
5 toward the constitutional purpose standard but instead is animated more by the idea of extracting
the federal judiciary from the "political thicket" and the federal government from the political
processes of states. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
Letting the state political process play itself out without interference from the federal courts or
the Attorney General certainly influences much of the Court's voting rights jurisprudence over the
last decade or so. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (plurality opinion) (declining to
allow the federal judiciary to find redistricting plans to be unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders);
compare Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (denying the State the ability to create a district that lets
minority voters elect a candidate of choice when it was drawn after Attorney General's denial of
approval of redistricting plan), with Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (allowing the State to
create a district that lets minority voters elect a candidate of choice when no interference by Attorney
General); see also Melissa L. Sanders, A Cautionary Tale: Hunt v. Cromertie and the Next
Generation of Shaw Litigation, 1 ELECTION L.J. 173, 188 (2002) (describing how the Court's
decision in Cromertie came in a context that was "substantially different" because the districting
plan was not drawn to comply with the Department of Justice's so-called "maximization policy").
So maybe Georgia should be viewed more as a federalism or political question decision.
While undoubtedly these motivations played some role in Georgia, I think the opinion has
more to do with a substantive interpretation of what constitutes racial discrimination rather than
federalism or political question concerns. This is because Georgia does not greatly limit the power
of the Attorney General or the D.C. District Court to deny preclearance of a voting change because
few changes actually end up being rejected by those entities. Compare supra note 102 (noting that
during a four-year period the Attorney General interposed only 34 objections), with
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/changes_00s.htm (last revised July 1, 2004) (listing the tens
of thousands of changes reviewed by the Attorney General during that time period).
One other word about politics here. The Court's test seems to provide "flexibility" for each
major political party to get federal approval of a statewide redistricting plan. See supra note 16
(discussing the "flexibility" that the retrogression test allows states). As Professor Pamela S. Karlan
has observed:
Democratic incumbents and party officials advance, although they do not call it this, a
governance-driven model of minority voting rights: They claim that blacks and (at least
some) Hispanics would maximize their voting strength by seeking legislatures whose
overall composition is most favorable to minority [voting] interests (i.e., majority-
Democratic bodies). This can best be accomplished by drawing districts in which
minority voters contribute to the victory base of a broad range of (largely white)
Democratic candidates. Recently, Republicans have countered with an exclusively
aggregation-driven model. They claim that minorities are best off when they can elect
individual candidates of their choice from districts where they control, rather than
influence, outcome [sic]. Like the Democratic model, which is aimed at creating
Democratic-controlled bodies, the Republican model will, the Republicans hope, lead to
Republican-controlled legislatures.
Karlan, supra note 81, at 1708. Georgia seems likely to allow Republicans to continue their strategy
of creating the same number or an additional number of "safe" seats while reducing minority voting
strength in "coalition" and "influence" districts. In turn, Democrats will be allowed to weaken some
"safe" districts in order to give minority voters greater voice through "coalition" and "influence"
districts.
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B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
While the individual elements of the new retrogression test evince a
movement toward the constitutional purpose standard, so does the overall
characterization of the test as a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry. 79
Creation of a totality test arguably marks a move toward the constitutional
purpose standard for one obvious reason: it means that, by definition,
retrogression no longer amounts to just a discriminatory impact test. Using a
phrase like the "totality of the circumstances" to describe the Section 5
effects standard thus provides more wiggle room for proponents of the
statute's constitutionality to argue that the retrogression standard looks at a
host of factors aside from pure discriminatory effect.
In a way, using the totality of the circumstances for the Section 5 effects
test moves it somewhat closer to the manner in which the Court generally
reviews claims of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
2 80
- by examining the impact of the governmental action on minority persons
in conjunction with a host of different factors that might (or might not)
provide circumstantial evidence of the existence of a discriminatory
21purpose. 81 With this type of analysis of circumstantial evidence of purpose
being especially prevalent in constitutional voting cases where the Court
seems more willing to find discriminatory intent from "an aggregate of
factors having at best an indirect bearing on motivation.
282
In addition, the use of a totality test for Section 5 creates a symbiosis of
language with another provision of the Voting Rights Act - the well-
established totality of the circumstances standard from the Section 2
"results" test.283 As mentioned earlier, the "results" test primarily serves as a
279. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 480, 484.
280. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (describing how discriminatory purpose may
"be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts").
281. To determine whether a government action was motivated by discriminatory purpose, one
must make a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available." Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
Whether the action "bears more heavily on one race than another ... provide[s] an important
starting point" for discovering whether discriminatory purpose is at work. Id. (quoting Davis, 426
U.S. at 442). In addition, other factors to review include:
1) "[t]he historical background of the decision... particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes;"
2) "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision;"
3) "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence... [and slubstantive
departures ... particularly if the factors usually considered important by the
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached;" and
4) "[t]he legislative or administrative history."
Viii. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68. This list, however, is not "exhaustive" of the factors
that might be considered when making an inquiry into the presence or absence of discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 268.
282. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1127
(1989).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). Section 2 reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
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means for attacking minority vote dilution, 284 and the Section 2 "results" test
also, at first glance, might appear to be a shift of the constitutional standard
from a purpose test to an effects test.285 After all, looking to "results" would
seem akin, at least semantically, to looking at "effects" or "impact.
2 86
Nonetheless, the federal courts have been unanimous in upholding the
constitutionality of the Section 2 "results" test.287  Why have the federal
courts proved such stalwart supporters of Section 2 - even after the Court's
recent pronouncements limiting Congress's enforcement power?288  As a
practical matter, circuit and district judges know how to count votes on the
Supreme Court. With a Court very ideologically divided on issues of race
and federalism, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has become the all important
swing vote that determines whether racial voting remedies stand or fall.289
Even though Justice O'Connor has not had the opportunity to cast a vote on
the constitutionality of Section 2, she has strongly implied she would uphold
that provision of the Voting Rights Act as a proper exercise of Congress's
enforcement power.29 °
1973(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members
of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
284. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
285. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 15-16 n.81 ("The 1982 amendment to [Section] 2 was for
the express purpose of declaring the congressional intent that a violation of the statute could be
established by showing the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice.").
286. Granted, one could argue that because Congress used the term "results" instead of the term
"effect," Congress intended the term "results" to mean something different from the term "effect."
287. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 991 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing circuit and district
court cases upholding the constitutionality of Section 2).
288. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1040 (D. Colo. 2004).
289. See Guard, supra note 107, at 359 (describing the constitutionality of Section 2 as "hinging
on Justice O'Connor's vote"); see also David S. Broder, O'Connor's Special Role, WASH. POST,
OCT. 1,2003, at A23 (describing Justice O'Connor's role as the "swing vote" on the current Court);
Tony Mauro, It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Court, TEX. LAW., July 7, 2003, at 12 (describing Justice
O'Connor's dominant role on the Court).
290. In Bush, Justice O'Connor took the unusual step of concurring in her own majority opinion.
517 U.S. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In that concurrence, she asserted that the
"Supremacy Clause obliges the States to comply with all constitutional exercises of Congress'
power." Id. at 991-92. Thus, the Court "should allow States to assume the constitutionality of
[Section] 2 of the VRA." Id. at 992. According to Justice O'Connor, this conclusion was:
... bolstered by concerns of respect for the authority of Congress under the
Reconstruction Amendments. The results test of [Section] 2 is an important part of the
apparatus chosen by Congress to effectuate this Nation's commitment to confront its
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Aside from this pragmatic approach lies a more principled reason to
think Section 2 remains constitutional under the recent Court decisions -
the Section 2 standard strongly resembles the constitutional standard for
proving unconstitutional vote dilution. 29' The test for proving the
unconstitutional establishment or maintenance of a dilutive voting system
was last expounded upon by the Court in Rogers v. Lodge.292 In Lodge, the
Court noted "that discriminatory intent... may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts., 293 The Court then discussed what sort of
evidence might serve as relevant facts, listing: (1) the minority voter
registration rate; (2) the extent of racially polarized voting; (3) the electoral
success of minority candidates; (4) the existence of past discrimination in the
political process; (5) the existence of past discrimination in education and
employment; (6) whether elected officials were unresponsive to minority
constituents; (7) whether minority citizens suffer from a depressed socio-
economic status; (8) the size of the area encompassed by an at-large district;
(9) the legitimate state interest in using at-large elections; and (10) whether
other discriminatory devices, such as numbered posts and a majority vote
requirement, were used in the electoral system. 94
Meanwhile, the test for proving that an electoral system dilutes minority
votes in violation of Section 2 was principally delineated in Thornburg v.
Gingles.295 In Gingles, the Court listed the following factors as relevant to
the totality analysis: (1) a sufficiently large and geographically compact
minority group that could form a majority population in a single-member
district; (2) a politically cohesive minority group; (3) a majority group that
votes as a bloc to usually defeat a minority group's chosen candidates; (4) a
history of discrimination in voting; (5) the extent to which discriminatory
devices, such as numbered posts, majority-vote requirements, or unusually
large election districts, have been used; (6) the exclusion of minority citizens
from any candidate slating process; (7) a history of discrimination in
education and employment; (8) the use of racial appeals during election
campaigns; (9) the success of minority candidates; (10) the unresponsiveness
of elected officials to minority constituents; and (11) the policy underlying
the use of at large elections.296
conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution with respect to equality in voting.
Congress considered the test necessary and appropriate to ensure the full protection of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ....
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fairness, however, Bush does predate the recent
Court decisions that scale back Congress's enforcement power.
291. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 32
(1982) (describing how difficult it is to distinguish the constitutional standard for vote dilution from
the Section 2 results test).
292. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
293. Id. at 618 (internal quotations omitted).
294. Id. at 623-27.
295. 478 U.S. 30(1986).
296. Id. at 44-51 (plurality opinion).
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As is apparent, the evidentiary factors considered under both the
constitutional and statutory standards are nearly, though by no means
precisely, identical.297 The main difference is that Gingles places a bit more
emphasis on certain foundational factors, such as the ability of minority
voters to comprise a majority of the population in a single-member district
and racially polarized voting that results in the usual defeat of the preferred
candidates of minority voters.298
What this all means for future constitutional challenges to the Section 5
retrogression test is this: if the "totality of the circumstances" Section 2
results test continues to be viable as a congressional remedy because it hews
close enough to the constitutional standard previously handed down by the
Court then, by analogy, the "totality of the circumstances" Section 5 effects
test continues to be viable as a congressional remedy because it too hews
close enough to the constitutional standard previously handed down by the
Court.
But maybe the analogy only goes so far. The Section 2 totality test and
the Section 5 totality test look at different evidentiary factors. And the Court
has sought to keep the two standards at arms length. 299 This is because of
the differing purposes behind the two Voting Rights Act provisions: Section
5 works to prevent changes to the status quo that will make minority voters
worse off while Section 2 works to remediate a dilutive status quo.
Considered another way, the Court distinguishes between the two provisions
to insure that Section 5 stays true to its "limited substantive goal.,
300
However, these different purposes serve to explain why the evidentiary
factors would be different.3 ° ' Moreover, even though the Court has sought
297. Guard, supra note 107, at 359 (describing how there may not be a large tension between the
Court's idea of vote dilution in Rogers and Congress's idea of vote dilution codified in Section 2).
Accord United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In fact, calling
section 2's test a 'results test' is somewhat of a misnomer because the test does not look for mere
disproportionality in electoral results. Rather, plaintiffs must establish that under the totality of the
circumstances, the challenged procedure prevents minorities from effectively participating in the
political process.").
298. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 (plurality opinion) (allowing that election systems will generally
not violate Section 2 unless a bloc voting majority usually defeats candidates supported by a
minority group that is politically cohesive and geographically insular); see also Harvell v.
Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("Satisfaction of the
necessary Gingles preconditions carries a plaintiff a long way towards showing a Section 2
violation.").
299. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) ("We refuse to equate a [Section] 2 vote
dilution inquiry with the [Section] 5 retrogression standard."); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
883 (1994) (plurality opinion) (describing how Sections 2 and 5 "differ in structure, purpose, and
application").
300. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 477.
301. For now, Section 2's totality test arguably looks at more factors that appear to be an inquiry
into purposeful discrimination than Section 5's totality test. This makes sense because Section 5
involves a current change that has a discriminatory impact. In contrast, Section 2 often involves
maintenance of an electoral system that has been implemented for many years and may have
gradually resulted in a dilution of minority voting strength. Put differently, it would seem
to differentiate the two standards, the Georgia opinion, at one point,
explicitly analogizes the two.30 2  Finally, throughout the Georgia opinion,
Justice O'Connor finds support for the majority position in the seminal
Section 2 case, Thornburg v. Gingles,3 °3 citing to that opinion eighteen
times.3°
C. Closer To, But Not Exactly, A Constitutional Discriminatory Purpose
Test
While Georgia appears to solve Section 5's separation of powers
problem, it is important to establish that, even though the retrogression test
now more closely resembles a test that searches for a racially discriminatory
purpose, the new retrogression test cannot be exactly equated with the
constitutional purpose standard. This is because discriminatory effects still
play a prominent, if no longer absolutely conclusive, role in the retrogression
analysis. Georgia makes abundantly clear that the comparative "ability of
minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice is an important one ' 305
and "remains an integral feature' 306 of the retrogression analysis. So
discriminatory effects still matter, and in no small way. Moreover, the
Section 5 retrogression test does not include any ultimate finding of
discriminatory purpose. This makes it easier to meet than the constitutional
standard because the new retrogression test requires a lower quantum of
circumstantial evidence from which to infer purpose and, in the real world,
judges tend to be extremely cautious about labeling government officials as
purposeful racial discriminators.3 °7
reasonable to require less purpose-type evidence when the current governing body has taken direct
recent action that will have a racially discriminatory impact, as opposed to the inaction of
maintaining an electoral system that harms minority voters.
302. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 484 ("As Justice Souter recognized for the Court in the [Section] 2
context, a court or the Department of Justice should assess the totality of the circumstances in
determining retrogression under [Section] 5.") (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020-21
(1994)).
303. 478 U.S. 30 (1980).
304. Justice O'Connor cited to Justice Brennan's Gingles plurality opinion three times. Georgia,
539 U.S. at 478, 480, 485. She used fourteen cites to her Gingles concurrence. Id. at 478, 479-80,
480 (three citations), 482 (three citations), 483, 484, 485 (two citations), 489, 490.
305. Id. at 480.
306. Id. at 484.
307. As Professor Pamela S. Karlan has observed:
Judges, after all, often live in the same milieu as other public officials and far away from
the plaintiffs who bring racial vote dilution lawsuits. If they are compelled to call their
acquaintances evil in order to do justice, then they may find themselves tempted to shade
their judgment in even remotely close cases.
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 735 (1998).
A good example of a federal judge's discomfort with finding discriminatory purpose in a
voting case can be found in a recent opinion that held Charleston County, South Carolina, in
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court wrote:
... [T]his Order is radically not a condemnation of the citizenry of Charleston County
but rather a recognition that the specific bulwark of an at-large system, in twisted concert
with the particular geographic and historical realities of this County, unlawfully and
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It might be argued that, despite Georgia, the Section 5 effects test
remains a change of the constitutional standard that violates the Court's
recent decisions. Why? Because one could contend that the Court's recent
decisions prevent Congress from changing the constitutional standard one
iota and that the Section 5 retrogression test still requires less than full-
blown proof of a constitutional violation. But even the Court's recent cases
have consistently recognized Congress's ability to go somewhat further than
the constitutional standard.30 8 Congress, through legislation, can provide
greater substantive protection for minority voters than would be provided by
the Court - just not too much greater substantive protection, or at least not
substantive protection that amounts to a complete and total reversal of a
constitutional purpose standard.
One might also argue that the plain language of the statute amounts to a
per se violation of the Court's doctrine by use of the word "effect."30 9
However, such a plain language argument would ignore the nuance of
Section 5. Namely, how the Beer Court redefined the term "effect" to mean
institutionally inhibit a community of voters in Charleston County from equal access to
the electoral process. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the
"essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). In other words, a violation of Section 2 may arise from
the structure of the electoral process itself plus the effects of past discrimination without
regard to any present discriminatory intent. This case is one such instance.
Undoubtedly there are bigots among us, and while their stories uncomfortably texture the
four corners of the Court's decision, this Order is little about them. If the trial on the
merits demonstrated anything, it is that Charleston County can celebrate a rich legacy of
individuals selflessly working towards a true community among its many races.
Notwithstanding, the current at-large system, as it exists in a county of this size,
unlawfully exacerbates the disadvantaged political posture inherited by generations of
African-Americans through centuries of institutional discrimination.
United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (D.S.C. 2003).
308. See Tennesse v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004) ("We have thus repeatedly affirmed that
Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct,
in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.") (internal quotes omitted); Nevada Dept. of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its ...
[enforcement] power, do more than simply proscribe conduct that we have held unconstitutional.");
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("Congress is not limited to
mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence."); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997))
("Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the [Fourteenth] Amendment includes the authority both to
remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 638 (1999) (noting
Congress's enforcement power allows for passage of statutes even if those statutes "prohibit[]
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional"); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)) ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which
is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States."').
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
313
"retrogression" and how the Georgia Court has further embellished upon the
retrogression standard.31° Moreover, Congress can most certainly, as a
matter of linguistics, outlaw practices that have a discriminatory effect.3 1 In
the final analysis, and what I argue here, is that a constitutional purpose test
cannot be completely and wholly replaced by a "pure" statutory effects test,
but rather any statutory effects test must work in practice to appear to be
"smoking out" discriminatory purpose.
In sum, the new test for retrogression will likely to work as follows:
when a voting change results in a small discriminatory effect, it will be
granted preclearance unless strong evidence exists to demonstrate an
improper motive; when a voting change results in a great discriminatory
effect, it will be denied preclearance even if only a little evidence exists to
demonstrate improper motive.3 12 And what does "evidence" of "improper
motive" mean? It means circumstantial evidence that the reason for the
change is pretextual or represents a tenuous governmental interest. In
essence, this closely resembles how discriminatory purpose works in the real
world. When a government action has a great disparate impact and a
tenuous governmental interest, a plaintiff challenging that action needs to
produce a lower quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove improper
motive; but when a government action has a slight disparate impact and a
legitimate governmental interest, a plaintiff must produce a greater quantum
of circumstantial evidence (and maybe even, in such a case, direct evidence)
to prove improper motive.313
V. CONCLUSION
Georgia presents a whole host of issues and problems-far too
numerous and complicated to adequately explore in any single article.
Georgia could result in minority voters losing important power in state and
local governments-power that has taken years of toil and struggle to obtain.
And Georgia may create a standard for retrogression that the Attorney
General and the federal courts will find impossible to administer in a
consistent, predictable fashion. But despite the potential negatives the
decision may have for minority voters, Georgia does bring Section 5 more
into line with the Court's idea of what constitutes a proper separation of
powers when Congress exercises its enforcement power.
310. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); Georgia, 539 U.S. at 479-85.
311. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986 ("When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional
discrimination, [Section] 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes it to enact prophylactic
legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the
basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.").
312. When it is a close call and the evidence appears to be in equipoise, then federal approval
should be denied because the submitting jurisdiction has the burden of proving the voting change
complies with Section 5. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing burden of proof).
313. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266 ("Sometimes a
clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action
even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.").
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